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Abstract 
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea establishes a 
regime for the oceans that includes a number of "zones" in addition to the 
traditional divisions of internal waters, territorial sea, and high seas. Although 
explicitly applicable only in peacetime, these new zones have a spillover effect 
on the law of naval warfare, particularly in the relationships between bel­
ligerents and neutral States. 
The spillover effect is most pronounced in the expanded territorial sea of 
twelve nautical miles and in archipelagic States. Mechanical extension of rules 
that were applicable to a narrow (three-nautical mile) territorial sea to these 
broader areas of national jurisdiction is likely to create additional tensions 
between neutrals and belligerents, perhaps widening the areas of conflict and 
drawing neutrals into it. The study concludes that despite the dangers of such 
a result, the developing law, as reflected in the military manuals of several 
maritime States, seems to accept the old rules as applicable to the new and 
expanded national zones in the oceans. 
The "New" Law of the Sea 
and 
The Law of Anned Conflict at Sea.1 




HE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION on the Law of the Sea? adopted 
at the close of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS III) in 1982, created what many conferees and others regard as 
a new constitution for the oceans. Although it has not yet entered into force,3 
and no major maritime State has ratified it, it has nevertheless had a profound 
impact on the law of the sea. President Ronald Reagan, while announcing that 
the United States would neither sign nor become a party to the Convention 
because its provisions on the mining of the deep seabed were fatally flawed, at 
the same time stated that, "'the convention also contains provisions with respect 
to traditional uses of the oceans which generally confirm existing maritime law 
and practice and fairly balance the interests of all states ... 4 The American Law 
Institute, in its authoritative Third Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law 
of the United States, went further, stating: 
[B]y express or tacit agreement, accompanied by consistent practice, the 
United States, and states generally, have accepted the substantive provisions 
of the Convention, other than those addressing deep sea-bed mining, as 
customary law binding upon them apart from the Convention.� 
The features of the Convention that have had the most impact on the practice 
of States are the new or expanded jurisdictional zones6 recognized in the 
Convention. These include the twelve-nautical-mile territorial sea, the twenty­
four-nautical-mile contiguous zone, the 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic 
zone (EEZ), the greatly expanded continental shelf, and archipelagic waters, all 
of which have in one way or another reduced the areas in which high seas 
freedoms may be exercised. A new regime for international straits-transit 
passage-is also an important development. 
Although, as will be developed below, the differentiation of an area of the ocean 
that is subject to the territorial sovereignty of the coastal state-the territorial 
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sea-had its origin in the practices of States in time of war-specifically in their 
assertions as neutrals that acts of hostilities should not take place close to their 
shores-the jurisdictional areas that are a part of the current law of the sea have 
been developed primarily for the protection of peacetime interests and are 
regarded as basically a peacetime regime. Nevertheless, by defining the areas 
that are subject to coastal State sovereignty or the exercise of other forms of 
jurisdiction, this regime may have significant effect on the exercise of both 
belligerent and neutral rights during time of armed conflict.7 As stated by 
Professor Bernard H. Oxman: 
To the extent one continues to divide public international law into the two 
classic categories-the laws of war and the laws of peace-the Convention 
on the Law of the Sea would doubtlessly fall within the latter category. This 
is so in the sense that the rules of anned conflict and neutrality are not 
addressed by the Convention. 
At the same time, the Convention does contain rules for dividing the oceans 
into different jurisdictional zones. Some of the rules of warfare and neutrality 
vary with the status of geographic areas. The integration of the new regimes 
of the law of the sea with the rules of naval and air warfare is accordingly a 
subject that merits attention. The classic dichotomy in the law of the sea 
between internal waters and the territorial sea on the one hand, and the high 
seas on the other, has yielded to new subtleties and modalities, particularly 
in the regimes of straits, archipelagic waters, the exclusive economic zone 
and the continental shelf .! 
As suggested by Professor Oxman, the most significant effect of the new 
jurisdictional zones will be upon the rules of neutrality, where the relationship 
between neutrals and belligerents and the applicability of rules depends on the 
particular jurisdictional area in which hostile activities take place. For that 
reason, this paper concentrates principally on the effect that the establishment 
or recognition of new jurisdictional zones may have on the law of neutrality . 
Although some publicists have questioned the continued viability of the 
concepts of belligerency and neutrality in light of the adoption of the United 
Nations Charter and the limitations it has placed on the use of armed force,9 as 
experience in the two recent Persian Gulf conflicts demonstrate, there is no 
other body of law that deals adequately with the relationships between states 
that are party to the conflict and those that choose not to take part in it. As 
Professor Christopher Greenwood has stated: 
[T]he law of neutrality still provides the only body of rules sufficiently precise 
and detailed to regulate such matters as rights to intercept shipping. The 
casualties amongst "neutral" shipping in the Gulf [Iraq-Iran] conflict il­
lustrate the need for a detailed body of rules on this subject and the inadequacy 
of attempts to deal with such matters simply by reference to the broad 
principles of self-defence. 10 
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Accordingly, I shall use the terms "belligerent" and "neutral" to describe 
respectively those States that are involved in an anned conflict and those that 
are not taking part in the anned conflict. 
II 
A Brief History of the Origins and 
Development of "Zones" in the Oceansll 
The history of the law of the sea is a history of the tensions between coastal 
states seeking to exercise jurisdiction over or special interests in ocean waters 
lapping their shores and other states seeking to exercise freedoms of navigation, 
fishing, and other common interests in the oceans. 12 
Roman law recognized the doctrine of freedom of the seas, although it 
remains unclear whether the freedoms embraced in the doctrine applied to all 
or just to Roman citizens. 13 With the breakup of the Holy Roman Empire and 
the creation of numerous city-states and principalities in Europe, those bound­
ing the seas laid claim to vast expanses of the oceans, asserting exclusive rights 
of navigation and fishing within them and exacting tribute from the ships of 
other states that wished to sail "their" waters. 14 The trend toward national claims 
over vast expanses of the oceans reached its apogee near the end of the fifteenth 
century when Pope Alexander VI, in 1493, divided the then-known oceans of 
the world between Spain and Portugal. 15 A year later, in the Treaty of Tordesil­
las, Spain and Portugal confinned this arrangement, each claiming for itself a 
monopoly of navigation and commerce within its respective sphere. 16 
Even England, that later bastion of the freedom of the seas, laid claims to the 
seas that washed the British Isles during the reigns of the Plantagenet and Stuart 
monarchs, although the intervening Tudor Elizabeth actively opposed "the 
exclusive maritime sovereignty arrogated by Venice, Portugal, or Spain:'17 
The shrinking of these expansive claims began with the great juridical 
debates about mare liberum and mare clausum that occurred in the early 
seventeenth century. The most influential voice in these debates was that of 
Grotius, who, in 1609, published Mare Liberum,18 in which he argued for the 
right of the Dutch to trade in the East Indies, where the Portuguese claimed a 
monopoly on the right of trade and navigation flowing from the Papal Bull and 
Treaty of Tordesillas. Grotius' arguments for the freedom of the seas and 
against the acquisition of property rights in the oceans were repeated and refmed 
in his more extensive work, The Law of War and Peace,19 published in 1625. 
Grotius' books went unchallenged by Portuguese and Spanish publicists, 
against whose claims they were specifically directed, but they struck a nerve in 
England, where Welwood and later Selden undertook the defense of the Stuart 
monarchs' pretensions to dominion over the "British seas" (the extent of which 
were never clearly defined), particularly with respect to the right to exclude 
3 
The Newport Papers 
Dutch fishennen and the practice of requiring the striking of the flag to British 
men-of-war in those seas.20 
England continued to assert its dominion over "British seas" during the Stuart 
monarchies (1603- 17 14) as well as during the Interregnum period of the 
Commonwealth and Protectorate (1649- 1659). The Scandinavian States made 
similar claims to the waters of the Baltic and the western seas between the 
Scandinavian States and Iceland and Greenland. The main opponent of these 
extravagant claims was the United Provinces (the Dutch), whose international 
commerce and fishing fleets predominated during that period. Their resistance 
to British demands for the striking of topsails and flag in the presence of British 
men-of-war and their insistence on the right of their fishing fleet to fish in 
"British seas" precipitated three naval wars with England during the seven­
teenth century. At various times during these tumultuous times of shifting 
alliances the Dutch were joined by France and other continental powers. 
During these same times, however, the embryo of the concept of a territorial 
sea2l began to take shape. Grotius himself had addressed only the vast expanses 
of the oceans, and he recognized that some enclosed and narrow parts of the 
sea might be subjected to control from the adjacent land territory. Later, as 
stated by Fulton: 
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries another principle was 
gradually evolved, and was ultimately accepted as furnishing such a natural 
basis, so that it may now be regarded as an established part of international 
law. It was, that the maritime dominion of a state ended where its power of 
asserting continuous possession ended. The belt of sea along the coast which 
could be commanded and controlled by artillery on shore thus came to be 
regarded as the territorial sea belonging to the contiguous state. Beyond the 
range of guns on shore the sea was common.22 
The evolution of this principle owes its origins to the law of neutrality, where 
prize courts held that the prizes taken within the range of guns of a neutral fort 
were not "good prize" and were restored to their owners.23 It was reinforced by 
the practice of vessels rendering a salute when they came within the range of 
the artillery of a foreign fort.24 At the beginning of the eighteenth century, the 
Dutch jurist Cornelius van Bynkershoek "transferred in theory to all parts of a 
coast this decisive property of compulsion and dominion which, strictly speak­
ing, only existed where forts or batteries were placed. ,,25 Bynkershoek's prin­
ciple became known as the "cannon-shot rule," and since the range of cannon 
in Bynkershoek's era was about three nautical miles or one marine league, it 
became the equivalent of a three-nautical-mile territorial sea. Although 
Bynkershoek's theory did not receive immediate universal acceptance, it did, 
over the next century, become "incorporated into international law as the rule 
for fixing the boundary of the territorial waters. ,,26 The causes for this gradual 
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acceptance of a narrow band of territorial sea along the coast were, according 
to Fulton, twofold: 
One was the moral and material victory of the Dutch Republic in its long and 
persistent struggle against the exorbitant claims to maritime dominion, first 
of Spain and Portugal, and then of England and Denmark. The other was the 
great extension of commerce and navigation, in which England secured an 
ever-increasing share, so that in the [eighteenth] century we find her taking 
the part of Holland in opposition to the Danish claims to mare clausum. As 
maritime commerce extended and the security of the sea became established, 
.it was felt more and more that claims to a hampering sovereignty and 
jurisdiction were incompatible with the general welfare of nations; and as the 
states interested in this commerce had the greatest power, the assertion of a 
wide dominion was gradually abandoned, surviving only in remote regions 
or in enclosed seas like the Baltic.27 
For whatever reasons (and international-law scholars are not always in 
agreement as to what they are), by the end of the eighteenth century or early in 
the nineteenth century there was international acceptance of the idea that a 
nation's territorial sea was constituted by a uniform band along its coast, 
generally considered to be three nautical miles in width.28 By the end of the 
nineteenth century, of course, the range of cannon greatly exceeded three 
nautical miles, but despite the assertions of many publicists as to the illogic of 
preservation of a principle whose underlying theoretical basis was outdated,29 
the principle remained essentially intact until the end of World War II. As stated 
by Jessup, "it remained because the nations found it a convenient compromise 
between conflicting interests. ,,30 
During this same period there developed also a legal regime of the territorial 
sea as well as a generally accepted rule as to its breadth. Despite varying theories 
that existed in the nineteenth century as to the nature of the territorial sea 
(sovereignty, jurisdiction, bundle of servitudes, etc.), by the early twentieth 
century, "scarcely any author took issue with the notion that the territorial sea 
is subject to sovereignty.,,31 This theory of sovereignty was confirmed by 
national practice and codifications of the 1920s as well as the preparatory work 
for the Hague Codification Conference of 1930,32 the International Law 
Commission's Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea,33 and the 1958 Geneva 
Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone?4 This principle is 
carried forward into the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea, which provides, inter alia, in article 2, that, "The sovereignty of a coastal 
State extends, beyond its land territory and internal waters ... to an adjacent 
belt of sea, described as the territorial sea. ,,35 
The sovereignty exercised by the coastal State over its territorial sea is the 
same as for its land areas and internal waters save for the right of ships of other 
nationalities to pass through the territorial sea in the exercise of the right of 
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innocent passage in time of peace.36 Whether innocent passage includes the 
right of warships to pass without prior notification or consent in time of peace, 
and the extent of permissible regulation or suspension of innocent passage in 
time of war, will be examined below.37 
Concurrently with the development of the law of the territorial sea, a number 
of States also asserted certain rights more limited than full sovereignty in areas 
of the oceans beyond the narrow territorial sea. These took a number of forms 
and were extended to various distances from shore. Until all such acts were 
repealed in 1876, Great Britain had several laws (commonly referred to as 
"hovering acts") extending jurisdiction for enforcement of customs and excise 
laws to as much as four leagues (twelve nautical miles) from shore.38 As early 
as 1799 the United States had similar laws applicable to ships bound for United 
States ports, and in several cases the United States Supreme Court recognized 
the lawfulness of the enforcement of similar rights by other States beyond the 
limits of the territorial sea.39 Russia, France, Belgium, Italy, and Spain had 
similar laws extending to varying distances beyond three miles, as did the 
Scandinavian States.40 Several South American States adopted zones extending 
to twelve nautical miles for fiscal, revenue, and security purposes.41 Great 
Britain, having repealed the last of its "hovering acts" in 1876, strongly 
contested the right of other States to enforce such laws. It was joined by a 
number of other States in protesting the United States' pretensions to enforce 
its anti-liquor laws beyond the three-mile limit during the Prohibition Era.42 For 
these reasons, as well as the lack of uniformity both as to the content and outer 
limits for zones of special jurisdiction, it is difficult to conclude that the right 
to establish such zones had become a part of customary intemational law, at 
least until 1958 when the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous 
Zone recognized the contiguous zone for the purposes of preventing infringe­
ments of a coastal State's customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary regula­
tions.43 
Although a number of States at various times claimed the exclusive right to 
exploit the fishery resources off their shores beyond the territorial sea or at least 
to regulate their exploitation,44 such a right was not recognized in customary 
international law,4s even though as Fulton states, the three-mile limit "was 
selected, not on any grounds special to fisheries, but because it had been already 
recognised and put into force in connection with the rights of neutrals and 
belligerents in time of war. . .. [I]ts application to the right of fishing is 
accidental and arbitrary ... 46 
At the conclusion of the Second World War, then, the only area of the ocean 
as to which it might be said that a coastal State had an undisputed right under 
international law to exercise jurisdiction and control was the territorial sea. Any 
rights beyond that outer boundary were subject to dispute unless contained in 
a treaty. At that point in time, therefore, the oceans were divided into three 
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distinct areas-(1) internal waters, that is, waters inside the baseline, (2) the 
territorial sea of a breadth of three nautical miles over which the coastal State 
exercised full sovereignty except for the right of innocent passage by surface 
ships of other States, and (3) the high seas, which included all other waters of 
the oceans, in which aU States were entitled to the freedoms of the high seas, 
which included, inter alia, the freedoms of navigation, fishing, scientific 
research, and laying of undersea cables and pipelines, and in time of war, the 
right of belligerents to conduct hostilities in accordance with the law of anned 
conflict at sea. 
The event which triggered the demise of this tripartite division of the oceans 
and resulted ultimately in today's multiple and overlapping zones of coastal­
state jurisdiction was President Harry Truman's Proclamation of the United 
States's claim to jurisdiction and control over the natural resources of the seabed 
and subsoil of the continental shelf of the United States.47 The outer boundary 
of the continental shelf was not defined in the Proclamation, but an accompany­
ing White House Press release stated that generally the continental shelf 
extended to a point at which the depth of the water was 100 fathoms (600 feet).48 
Although the Proclamation carefully delimited the extent of the claim and 
explicitly affinned that "[t]he free and unimpeded navigation of the high seas 
above the continental shelf and rights under international law with respect to 
free swimming fish are in no way thus affected," this unilateral claim by the 
then-preeminent maritime power and one of the leading exponents of the 
freedom of the high seas opened the door for wider and more comprehensive 
unilateral claims by other states. The broadest of these were claims by several 
Central and South American States to extend their territorial seas to a breadth 
of 200 nautical miles. The relative unifonnity and tranquility which had existed 
for about 150 years with respect to the law of the sea began to erode. The era 
of "creeping jurisdiction" had begun. 
Concurrently, the International Law Commission (ILC) began its studies 
leading ultimately to the development of a draft convention on the law of the 
sea. In its successive drafts of articles on the law of the sea prior to the convening 
of the First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1958, the ILC 
was unable, however, to agree on a breadth of the territorial sea. In the articles 
produced at its Eighth Session, which served as the negotiating text for the 1958 
Conference, the article on the breadth of the territorial sea provided as follows: 
Article 3 
1. The Commission recognizes that international practice is not unifonn 
as regards the delimitation of the territorial sea. 
2. The Commission considers that international law does not pennit an 
extension of the territorial sea beyond twelve miles. 
3. The Commission, without taking any decision as to the breadth of the 
7 
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territorial sea up to that limit, notes, on the one hand, that many States have 
fixed a breadth greater than three miles and, on the other hand, that many 
States do not recognize such a breadth when that of their own territorial sea 
is less. 
4. The Commission considers that the breadth of the territorial sea should 
be fixed by an international conference.49 
Although the first UN Conference on the Law of the Sea adopted four 
conventions on the law of the sea, one of which was the Convention on the 
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone,50 the conferees were unable to agree on 
an article establishing the breadth of the territorial sea, primarily because of the 
wide disagreement as to whether States could exercise exclusive control over 
fisheries in a zone beyond the limits of the territorial sea. Consequently, in its 
next session, the United Nations General Assembly voted almost unanimously 
to convene a Second Conference in 1960 exclusively "for the purpose of 
considering further questions of the breadth of the territorial sea and fishery 
Iimits.,,5l This Second Conference also failed to reach agreement on the breadth 
of the territorial sea, rejecting by a one-vote margin a compromise proposal 
sponsored jointly by the United States and Canada for a six-mile territorial sea 
with an additional six-mile exclusive fishery zone beyond that.52 
The 1958 Conference did, however, succeed in reaching agreement on the 
contiguous zone which prior to the Conference had been disputed. 53 Article 24 
of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous zone provides, inter 
alia, as follows: 
1. In a zone of the high seas contiguous to its territorial sea, the coastal 
State may exercise the control necessary to: 
(a) Prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary 
regulations within its territory or territorial sea; 
(b) Punish infringement of the above regulations committed within its 
territory or territorial sea. 
2. The contiguous zone may not extend beyond twelve miles from the 
baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. 
The article adopted by the Conference was identical to that proposed by the 
ILC in its final draft except for the addition of the word "immigration" in 
paragraph l(a). The ILC's Commentary on its draft article includes the follow­
ing comments: 
(1) International law accords States the right to exercise preventive or 
protective control for certain purposes over a belt of the high seas contiguous 
to their territorial sea. It is, of course, understood that this power of control 
does not change the legal status of the waters over which it is exercised. These 
waters are and remain a part of the high seas and are not subject to the 
sovereignty of the coastal State, which can exercise over them only such 
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rights as are conferred on it by the present draft or are derived from interna­
tional treaties. S4 
Significantly, the Commission added the following comment : 
(4) The Commission did not recognize special security rights in the 
contiguous zone. It considered that the extreme vagueness of the term 
"security" would open the way for abuses and that the granting of such rights 
was not necessary. The enforcement of customs and sanitary regulations will 
be sufficient in most cases to safeguard the security of the State. In so far as 
measures of self-defence against an imminent and direct threat to the security 
of the State are concerned, the Commission refers to the general principles 
of international law and the Charter of the United Nations.ss 
The Convention also gave treaty recognition to the continental shelf doctrine, 
providing that coastal States exercise "sovereign rights" over the shelf for the 
purpose of "exploring it and exploiting its natural resources. ,,56 The outer limit 
was defined as the point at which the water depth reached "200 meters or, 
beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the 
exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas. ,,57 
Finally, the 1958 Convention incorporated into its provisions the principles 
enunciated by the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case58 for the adoption of straight 
baselines for portions of the coast which are marked by deep indentations or a 
fringe of coastal islands. Although these provisions result in only modest 
expansions of the national waters of a coastal State when the criteria for their 
use are appropriately applied, the practice of States since 1958 demonstrates a 
constant increase in their application to coastlines that do not fit the criteria, as 
well as expansive abuses of the criteria in situations where they may arguably 
be applicable. 59 The result has been to incorporate large areas that were 
fonnerly high seas into the internal waters or territorial seas of coastal States. 
In some cases, the adoption of straight baselines results in the appropriation of 
much larger areas of the high seas than would an increase of the breadth of the 
territorial sea to twelve miles or more. 
Following the failure of the Second UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, 
the three-mile territorial sea began to lose adherents. Figure 1 summarizes the 
status of the claims of states to various breadths of the terri torial sea from 1945 
to the present. By 1965, the three-mile claim had become a minority position 
with twelve miles being almost as common; by 1974, shortly after the opening 
of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), 
twelve-mile adherents outnumbered three-mile adherents almost 2 to 1. The 
erosion of consensus as to what was the proper breadth of the territorial sea was 
one of the motivating factors for calling the Third United Nations Conference 
on the Law of the Sea. 
9 
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The Expansion of Territorial Sea Claims 
Claims National 1945 1958 1965 1974 1979 1983 1991 
3 NM 46 45 32 28 23 25 9 
4-11 NM 12 19 24 14 7 6 5 
12 NM 2 9 26 54 76 78 112 
OVER 12 NM .Jl ....2 ....3. ....2Q ....2.S. ....3.Q -1.2 
Number of Coastal or 60 75 85 116 131 139 145 
Island Nations 
Figure 1 
Source: U.S. Department of the Navy 
III 
The Status of Maritime Zones in the 
Current Law of the Sea 
The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS ill) 
met from 1973 to 1982 and produced the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea. Although the Convention has not yet entered into force, its 
provisions concerning traditional uses of the oceans are widely considered as 
reflective of customary international law.60 The provisions of the Convention 
which are most likely to have an impact on the law of anned conflict at sea are 
the following: 
• States may establish the breadth of their territorial sea up to a limit not 
exceeding twelve nautical miles (article 3). 
• States may draw straight baselines using the same criteria adopted in the 
1958 Territorial Sea Convention (article 7). 
• States may establish a contiguous zone beyond their territorial sea over 
which they exercise a limited jurisdiction for the prevention of infringement of 
its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations with an outer 
limit no more than twenty-four nautical miles from the baseline (article 33); 
• States may establish an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) beyond and 
adjacent to the territorial sea out to a limit of 200 nautical miles from the 
baseline; in the EEZ they have "sovereign rights" for the purpose of exploring 
and exploiting, conserving and managing the living and non-living natural 
resources of the seabed and subsoil and superjacent waters; in the EEZ they also 
exercise jurisdiction as provided in other provisions of the Convention with 
regard to establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures, 
marine scientific research, and the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment (articles 55-57). Other States "enjoy" within the EEZ the freedoms 
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of navigation and overflight, laying of submarine cables and pipelines, "and 
other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, such as 
those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and 
pipelines, and compatible with the other provisions of this Convention" (article 
58).  Both the coastal State and other States are required, in exercising their 
rights in the EEZ, to have "due regard" for the rights of the other States and 
coastal States respectively (articles 56 and 58). 
• The outer boundary of the continental shelf is extended to 200 nautical 
miles from the baseline for all States, and for States with continental margins 
wider than 200 miles, to the edge of the margin according to a formula provided 
in the Convention, but in no case more than 350 nautical miles from the baseline 
or 100 nautical miles from the 2,500 meter isobath (article 76). 
• Straits embraced by the territorial sea of one or more States but used for 
international navigation between one part of the high seas or an EEZ and another 
part of the high seas or an EEZ are governed by the right of "transit passage," 
which permits "the freedom of navigation and overflight solely for the purpose 
of continuous and expeditious passage of the strait." Such passage may not be 
suspended (article 44), and passage may be made in the ship or aircraft's 
"normal mode" of operation (articles 37 and 38). Straits that have a ribbon of 
high seas or EEZ through them or are formed by an island and its mainland are 
not governed by the transit-passage regime if the high seas or EEZ route or the 
route seaward of the island is "of similar convenience with respect to naviga­
tional and hydrographical characteristics" (articles 36 and 37) . The regime for 
these latter categories of straits, and for straits leading to the territorial sea of a 
foreign State, is innocent passage (non-suspendable in the cases of island-main­
land straits and straits leading to the territorial sea of a foreign State)(article 
45). In addition, the regimes for straits "regulated in whole or in part by 
long-standing international conventions in force specifically relating to such 
straits" are unaffected by the straits provisions of the Convention (article 35(c)). 
• States which are comprised solely of islands or parts of islands, which 
form an intrinsic geographical, economic and political entity, and which meet 
certain criteria as to land-to-water ratio and distance of separation may draw 
straight archipelagic baselines joining the outermost points of the outermost 
islands and drying reefs of the archipelago (Articles 46 and 47) . The waters 
inside the baselines become "archipelagic waters" (article 49), and the territorial 
sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf are 
measured outward from these archipelagic baselines (article 48). The ar­
chipelagic State exercises sovereignty over archipelagic waters, their seabed 
and subsoil, and the airspace above, regardless of their depth or distance from 
the coast (article 49). All States have the right of "archipelagic sea lanes 
passage" (which is equivalent to "transit passage" through straits) through 
archipelagic sea-lanes designated by the archipelagic State or in the absence of 
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such designation through the routes nonnally used for international navigation. 
For other areas of archipelagic waters, the ships of all States have the right of 
innocent passage. 
• The unrestricted freedoms of the high seas are exercised only from the 
outer limit of the exclusive economic zone rather than from the outer limit of 
the territorial sea (article 86). The area for the exercise of full high seas freedoms 
has thus been reduced by the subtraction of those areas that comprise the EEZ. 
If all coastal and island States claim an EEZ of 200 miles, this will reduce the 
area of the high seas by approximately one-third. As outlined above, however, 
the freedoms of navigation and overflight and the freedoms to lay cables and 
pipelines are preserved in the EEZ subject to the right of those exercising them 
to have "due regard" for the legitimate activities of the coastal state in its EEZ. 
• The Convention creates an international seabed " Area," which is defined 
as "the sea-bed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction" (article 1). In effect, the "Area" comprises all of the seabed beyond 
the outer edge of the juridical continental shelf. Unlike the other zones discussed 
above, the " Area" is not subject to national jurisdiction or control but is regarded 
by the LOS Convention as the "common heritage of mankind" (article 135). 
Part XI of the Convention provides a regime and institutions for the purpose of 
exploration and exploitation of its mineral resources. Although Part XI has not 
been received into customary law as have the other Parts of the Convention, the 
"Area" will be briefly discussed in subsection V.G. below. 
The effect of the adoption of the 1982 Convention and absorption into 
customary intemational law of many of its provisions is to replace the three-fold 
division of the ocean (internal waters, a narrow territorial sea, and the high seas) 
with a multiplicity of broad and overlapping coastal areas under varying measures 
of jurisdiction and control by the contiguous states and a much reduced area of 
high seas. These divisions of the ocean are depicted in Figure 2. 
IV 
The Law of Armed Conflict at Sea and the 
Traditional Areas of the Oceans 
In order to understand how the emergence of new maritime areas may affect 
the law of anned conflict at sea, which has traditionally been conducted in 
oceans which juridically consisted of only three divisions-internal waters, 
territorial waters (territorial sea), and high seas-it is necessary to understand 
how this trifold division of the oceans affected the conduct of operations before 
the manifold and overlapping divisions of the present era were created. 
The essential overarching principles could be stated as follows: 
• First, the areas within which belligerents could conduct hostile operations 
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oceans beyond the territorial sea), the territorial sea and internal waters of 
belligerents, and the airspaces above these areas. 
• Second, the obverse of the first principle-as a general rule, hostile 
operations could not be conducted in the internal waters or territorial sea of a 
neutral State, nor in the airspace above these divisions of the oceans.61 
• Third, the neutral State is required to apply its neutrality regulations 
impartially to all belligerents engaged in the conflict.62 
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries these general principles 
were fleshed out by the practice of States into a set of generally agreed upon 
and rather formal rules of conduct. Most of them were codified in the Second 
Hague Peace Conference as the 1907 Convention (XIII) Concerning the Rights 
and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War.63 Although Hague XIII has not 
received universal ratification, and a number of important States, including the 
United Kingdom, have never ratified it, most of its provisions are considered 
to be declaratory of customary law.64 In any event, it comprises the latest 
expression in treaty form of the respective rights and duties of neutrals and 
belligerents with respect to hostile activities within neutral "maritime territory" 
(that is, internal waters and the territorial sea) and may be used as a starting 
point for discussion of these issues. 
The provisions of Hague XIII concerning the respective rights and obliga­
tions of belligerents and neutrals in neutral maritime territory that are most 
likely to be affected by the replacement of the singular coastal zone of the 
territorial sea with the multiplicity of coastal zones resulting from the 1982 
United Nations Convention are outlined below. Since ports are normally within 
internal waters, which are unaffected by the creation of additional zones beyond 
the territorial sea, I have not included the provisions of Hague XIII dealing 
solely with ports. On the other hand, roadsteads may be within either internal 
waters or the territorial sea and thus may be affected by the extension of the 
breadth of the territorial sea to twelve miles or the drawing of straight baselines. 
Accordingly, those provisions of Hague XIII dealing with "roadsteads" are 
included. The significant provisions of the Convention are as follows: 
Belligerents are required to respect the sovereign rights of neutral States and 
to abstain from acts that would constitute a violation of neutrality (article 1); 
Any act of hostility, including visit, search and capture by a warship in the 
territorial sea of a neutral power is a violation of neutrality (article 2); 
A neutral State must employ the "means at its disposal" to release a prize 
captured within its territorial sea (article 3); 
A prize court cannot be set up by a belligerent on neutral territory or on a 
vessel in neutral waters (article 4); 
Belligerents cannot use neutral ports or waters as a base of operations nor 
erect any apparatus to communicate with belligerent forces at sea (article 5); 
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A neutral Government must employ the "means at its disposal" to prevent 
the fitting out or arming of vessels within its jurisdiction which it believes are 
intended for cruising or engaging in hostile operations and to prevent departure 
from its jurisdiction of such vessels (article 8); 
A neutral State must apply its rules and restrictions impartially to the 
belligerents and may forbid the entry of vessels which have violated its rules 
or its neutrality (article 9); 
The "mere passage" of belligerent warships or prizes through a neutral's 
territorial sea does not affect the neutral's neutrality (article 10); 
A neutral power may allow belligerent warships to employ its pilots (in its 
territorial waters65)(article 11); 
Unless the neutral's regulations provide otherwise, belligerent warships may 
remain in neutral ports, roadsteads or territorial waters no more than 24 hours 
(article 12);66 
A neutral Power must notify a belligerent warship within its ports, roadsteads 
or territorial waters at the outbreak of hostilities to depart within 24 hours or 
such other period as required by the neutral's regulations (article 13); 
A belligerent warship may not prolong its stay in a neutral port except on 
account of damage or stress of weather and must depart as soon as the cause of 
delay is at an end (article 14); 
In neutral ports and roadsteads belligerent warships may carry out only 
repairs that are necessary to make them seaworthy. The local authorities may 
decide what repairs are necessary (article 17);67 
Belligerent warships may not use neutral ports, roadsteads, or territorial 
waters for replenishing their supplies of war material or armament or for 
completing their crews (article 18); 
In neutral ports or roadsteads belligerent vessels may revictual only to the 
peacetime standard and receive fuel only in sufficient quantity to reach the 
nearest port of their own country or fill their bunkers, if the latter is the formula 
adopted in the neutral's regulations (article 19). They may not make a repeat 
visit for refueling at the port of a neutral in any of whose ports they have refueled 
for the previous three months (article 20); 
A neutral State must exercise such surveillance "as the means at its disposal 
allow" to prevent violation of its territorial waters (article 25); and 
The exercise of its rights under the Convention by a neutral cannot be 
considered an unfriendly act by a belligerent (article 26). 
To reemphasize a point already made, when the Convention uses the term 
"neutral waters" or waters "within its jurisdiction," or similar terms, it is 
referring either to the internal waters or the territorial waters (territorial sea) of 
the neutral State, since those were the only areas of the oceans recognized at 
that time as being within the jurisdiction or sovereignty of the coastal State. 
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V 
The Impact of Changes in Jurisdictional Zones 
upon the Law of Neutrality 
A. The Territorial Sea. As developed above, the concept of the territorial sea 
originated with the claims of neutral States to prevent belligerent hostile 
activities from occurring close to their shores, and the breadth of the territorial 
sea was originally tied to the actual area that a coastal State could control from 
its shore, i. e., the range of shore-based artillery or three nautical miles. Although 
the range of cannon soon exceeded this short distance, the rights and duties of 
neutral and belligerent States in the offshore areas bounding neutral coastal 
States remained tied to the three-mile breadth of the territorial sea. The series 
of compromises which resulted in the rules which eventual1y became embedded 
in the law of neutrality were thus based on the assumption that they would apply 
only in a very narrow coastal margin, measured from baselines which cor­
responded to the low-water line along the coast. 
The territorial sea now has a breadth of up to twelve miles, and while the 
nonnal baseline is still the low-water line along the coast, many coastal States 
claim the right to draw straight baselines in a manner that extends the outer 
boundary of the territorial sea many miles more than twelve miles from the 
actual coast. (Although the waters inside these exaggerated baselines become 
internal waters, the right of innocent passage is preserved through them where 
they enclose areas which had previously not been considered as internal.)68 The 
combined effect of increasing the breadth of the territorial sea and allowing the 
use of straight baselines is thus to more than quadruple the area of the waters 
subject to coastal state sovereignty. This in turn raises the question of the 
continued applicability of all the rules summarized above to this broader band 
along a neutral's coast. 
Dr. Elmar Rauch, in his study of the issue, has no difficulty in concluding, 
without discussion, that the same rules apply in this expanded territorial sea that 
fonnerly applied in the narrow territorial sea. He states: 
As a matter of principle belligerents are bound to respect the sovereignty 
of neutral powers and to abstain, in neutral territory or neutral waters [by 
which he means the territorial sea and internal waters] from any act of 
warfare. Any act of hostility, including capture and the exercise of the right 
of search, committed by belligerent warships in the territorial waters of a 
neutral power, constitutes a violation of neutrality and is strictly forbidden.69 
Dr. Rauch may well be correct that such a conclusion can be drawn without 
further analysis. His conclusion is bolstered by the recently published United 
States Navy operational law manual, which explicitly accepts the idea that 
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extension of the territorial sea to twelve nautical miles does not affect the 
application of the laws of neutrality, stating: 
[l1he 12-nautical mile territorial sea is not, in and of itself, incompatible with 
the law of neutrality. Belligerents continue to be obliged to refrain from acts 
of hostility in neutral waters and remain forbidden to use the territorial sea of 
a neutral nation as a place of sanctuary from their enemies or as a base of 
• 70 operations. 
The Canadian71 and Gennan72 draft manuals, both of which were prepared 
subsequent to the adoption of the twelve-mile territorial sea, state without 
comment that any hostile acts within neutral territorial seas are prohibited. 
It, of course, goes without citation that internal waters and the territorial sea 
are subject to the sovereignty of the coastal State, save only for the right of 
innocent passage in the territorial sea, and that the cardinal principle of the law 
of neutrality is that belligerents may not conduct hostilities in neutral territory, 
land or sea. Nevertheless, one may question whether rules which were 
developed to apply to a narrow band of water along a neutral's coast should be 
applied automatically to a band that may be more than four times as wide. As 
outlined above, neutral States have an obligation to use the means at their 
disposal to conduct surveillance of their waters to ensure that belligerents do 
not violate their neutrality and to take preventive or corrective action if they 
detect such violations.73 A broader territorial sea presents a greater burden of 
surveillance and enforcement for the neutral State as well as a greater temptation 
for belligerent naval forces, especially submarines, to use neutral waters as 
"safe corridors" for passage to or from legitimate areas of hostilities, for transit 
to or from home ports, or as safe havens for rendezvous with replenishment 
ships. If neutral States are unable or unwilling to carry out their obligations to 
prevent such activities, the opposing belligerent may legitimately take hostile 
action against the enemy forces that are unlawfully using the neutral's territorial 
sea.74 Such actions would tend to embroil the neutral in the anned conflict rather 
than isolate it from such actions, which, of course, is the purpose of the law of 
neutrality. The passage of the A Itmark through the Norwegian territorial sea in 
World War 11,15 as well as Great Britain's claim that Gennan submarines were 
using the same sea as a thousand-mile-Iong "covered way" for passage of their 
submarines from home ports to operational areas in the open seas 76 are 
examples of how even a narrow territorial sea may tempt belligerents to test the 
limits of tolerance of both neutrals and opposing belligerents to the use of 
neutral territorial seas for safe havens from attack. Increasing the breadth of the 
territorial sea more than four-fold would undoubtedly vastly increase such 
temptations. 
In time of peace, the ships of all States, including warships,77 have the right 
of innocent passage through the territorial seas of all States. In time of war, 
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neutrals may, if they choose, allow "mere passage" of belligerent warships 
through their territorial seas without jeopardizing their neutral status.78 On the 
other hand, neutrals may, if they choose, close their territorial seas except for 
those parts leading to an international strait to passage by belligerent warships?9 
The temptations for belligerents to ignore a neutral State's closure of its 
territorial sea to passage, and the greater burdens of surveillance and enforce­
ment on neutrals will undoubtedly result in increased tensions in a broader 
territorial sea. 
Professor Michael Reisman and William K. Lietzau have recently written 
that, "In addition to their important function in dissemination and transmission 
of international legal information, [military operational] manuals are an impor­
tant mode for making international law as well as evidencing its existence.,,8o 
In other words, the military manuals promulgated by States represent the 
practice of such States. The fact that the manuals of three major maritime States 
(United States, Canada, and Germany) have accepted the rules that were 
applicable to a three-mile territorial sea as equally applicable to a twelve-mile 
territorial sea strongly suggests that these principles are being incorporated into 
customary international law despite rather strong arguments that could be made 
that the factual and theoretical underpinnings for these rules have been under­
mined by a quadrupling of the breadth of the territorial sea . 
B. International Straits. Although, as developed above, a neutral coastal State 
was permitted to close its territorial sea to all belligerent hostile activity, 
including "mere passage by belligerent warships" under the pre- 1982 regime 
of the territorial sea, it was also generally accepted that this right did not apply 
to those parts of the territorial sea that comprised an international strait. 8 1  This 
view was reinforced by the Corfu Channel case,82 which affirmed the right of 
British men-of-war to transit the strait between the Greek island of Corfu and 
the Albanian mainland which was a secondary passage between the Ionian and 
Adriatic Seas. In that case, the ICI stated: 
It is, in the opinion of the Court, generally recognized and in accordance with 
international custom that States in time of peace have a right to send their 
warships through straits used for international navigation between two parts 
of the high seas without previous authorization of a coastal State, provided 
the passage is innocent. 83 
This principle was codified in the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention as 
follows: 
There shall be no suspension of the innocent passage of foreign ships through 
straits which are used for international navigation between one part of the 
18 
high seas and another part of the high seas or the territorial sea of a foreign 
State. 84 
As the number of adherents to territorial seas of twelve or more miles 
expanded in the 1960s, a number of maritime States became concerned that the 
regime of nonsuspendable innocent passage would provide insufficient protec­
tion for undisputed transit rights through international straits. Not only did this 
increased breadth of the territorial sea bring the waters of dozens of important 
straits within the territorial seas of bordering States, some of these States gave 
a more restrictive meaning to the "innocent" half of the innocent passage 
definition than had been visualized by either the International Court of Justice 
in the Corfu Channel case or the negotiators of the 1958 Territorial Sea 
Convention. Some States based their determinations of innocence on such 
factors as ownership of vessels, cargo carried, or destination of voyage.85 As a 
result, a number of States, following the initiative of the United States and the 
Soviet Union, began to discuss the possibility of a third U.N. conference on the 
law of the sea for the purpose of establishing general agreement on a twelve­
mile territorial sea coupled with freedom of navigation for ships and aircraft 
through international straits. This movement coincided in time with Ambas­
sador Pardo's initiative in the U.N. General Assembly for internationalization 
of the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. The confluence of these 
two movements eventually resulted in the convening of the Third United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), one of whose 
outcomes was the adoption of the doctrine of "transit passage" for ships and 
aircraft through straits used for international navigation between the high seas 
or an EEZ and another part of the high seas or EEZ. 
The provisions of the LOS Convention concerning transit passage are 
contained in Part III of the Convention, "Straits Used for International Naviga­
tion." As previously stated, transit passage applies to all straits used for 
international navigation between the high seas or an EEZ and another part of 
the high seas or EEZ,86 with three exceptions, as follows: 
1 .  Straits in which passage is regulated in whole or in part by long-standing 
international conventions in force specifically relating to such straits; 87 
2. Straits through which there exists a high seas or EEZ route "of similar 
convenience with respect to navigational and hydrographical characteristics; 88 
and 
3. Straits formed by an island and mainland of the same State if there exists 
a high seas or EEZ route "of similar convenience with respect to the navigational 
and hydrographical characteristics" seaward of the island.89 
For the first category, the governing regime is that which is provided in the 
"long-standing international convention" regulating passage through it. For the 
second, it is ordinary (i. e. ,  suspendable) innocent passage as codified in the 
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territorial-sea Part of the Convention.90 For the third, the regime is nonsus­
pedable innocent passage.9 1 
By the terms of Part III of the LOS Convention, transit passage is more akin 
to the freedom of navigation exercised by ships and aircraft on the high seas 
than it is to innocent passage as codified in Part II of the Convention. Transit 
passage is defined as the exercise of the "freedom of navigation and over­
flight,,92 by ships and aircraft in their "normal modes of continuous and 
expeditious transit. ,,93 During transit passage ships and aircraft must proceed 
through the strait without delay, refrain from the threat or use of force against 
bordering States and other acts contrary to the U.N. Charter, and comply with 
other relevant provisions of Part III. In addition
, 
ships must comply with 
generally accepted rules for safety at sea and for the prevention, reduction, and 
control of pollution from ships, and aircraft must observe the leAO rules for air 
navigation94 and monitor the appropriate radio frequencies. Although ships and 
aircraft in transit passage must comply with the laws and regulations of the 
States bordering straits, the content of such rules is confined to the safety of 
navigation, the prevention of fishing by fishing vessels, the prevention of 
customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary offenses, and regulations which give 
effect to applicable international regulations for the control of pollution by oil 
and other noxious substances.95 States bordering straits may not impede transit 
passage nor adopt laws or regulations "that discriminate in form or in fact 
among foreign ships or in their application have the practical effect of denying, 
hampering or impairing the right of transit passage . . . .  ,,96 Even if the transiting 
ship or aircraft violates the laws or regulations of the States bordering a strait, 
these States may not deny or terminate the transit-passage rights of the ship or 
aircraft but must find their remedy in a civil suit if the offender is a merchant 
ship or civil aircraft or under the principles of State responsibility if it is a ship 
or aircraft entitled to sovereign immunity.97 
If under the pre-existing regime for straits it was generally accepted that 
neutral States could not deny passage to belligerent ships, including warships, 
in time of war, then ajortiori it should follow that this rule should be preserved 
under the more liberal transit-passage regime. But this new regime has two 
elements not included in the older one of nonsuspendable innocent passage: ( 1) 
it applies to aircraft; and (2) ships and aircraft may transit in their "normal 
mode."  The second of these has been interpreted as including the submarines' 
right to submerged transit.98 Does it necessarily follow that submerged passage 
by submarines and overflight by belligerent aircraft should be allowed under 
the doctrine of transit passage in time of war? Adopting a teleological approach, 
Dr. Rauch answers yes. He states : 
One of the advantages of the new transit passage concept is that it keeps the 
littoral States bordering straits with great strategic value out of the vicious 
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circle of escalation in times of tension and crisis. If transit through such straits 
were subject to the discretion of the coastal States, they would unavoidably 
become involved, even if the discretionary power were to be exercised 
evenhandedly . . . .  The ramifications of a refusal or of a permission of transit 
in whole or in part . . .  could, albeit legally non-discriminatory, in fact be of 
quite different military and strategic value to the parties to the conflict. . . .  
The escalation-preventing qual ity of transit passage in times of tension and 
crisis-i. e. ,  in time of fragile peace-are even more important for neutral 
States in times of armed conflict.99 
The United States naval manual asserts that the transit passage provisions of 
the LOS Convention are a part of customary international law and interprets 
them as providing very broad rights for passage of belligerent forces in time of 
war for straits bounded by neutral States, stating: 
Customary international law as reflected in the 1 982 Law of the Sea Conven­
tion provides that belligerent and neutral surface ships, submarines and 
aircraft have a right of transit passage through, over, and under all straits used 
for international navigation. Neutral nations cannot suspend, hamper, or 
otherwise impede this right of transit passage through international straits. 
Belligerent forces transiting through international straits overlapped by 
neutral waters must proceed without delay, must refrain from the threat or 
use of force against the neutral nation, and must otherwise refrain from acts 
of hostility and other activities not incident to their transit. Belligerent forces 
in transit may, however, take defensive measure consistent with their 
security, including the launching and recovery of aircraft, screen formation 
steaming, and acoustic and electronic surveillance. Belligerent forces may 
not use neutral straits as a place of sanctuary nor a base of operations, and 
bell igerent warships may not exercise the belligerent right of visit and search 
in those waters. 100 
The Canadian draft manual has a similar, though less extensive provision, 
as follows: 
Warships and military aircraft of a belligerent state may exercise the right of 
transit passage, that is, of essentially unimpeded passage or overflight in an 
appropriate state of readiness with appropriate sensors activated, through 
certain straits where the transit passage [regime?] applies . . . .  101  
The German draft manual does not address the issue of passage through 
neutral straits separately from the question of passage through the territorial  sea 
generally. It is to be recalled that the German manual appears to be ambiguous 
as to whether the right of innocent passage for belligerent warships through the 
territorial sea of a neutral State may be suspended. 102 
Based on the foregoing, both logic and state practice lead to the conclusion 
that the peacetime regime of transit passage, as formulated in Part III of the 
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LOS Convention, is equally applicable in time of anned conflict to the passage 
of belligerent warships (including submerged submarines) and aircraft through 
straits bounded by neutral States. 
One further aspect of the straits question deserves at least brief mention 
before leaving this subject; that is, the issue of straits governed by treaty 
regimes. As will be recalled, Article 35 of the LOS Convention excepted from 
the transit-passage regime, "straits in which passage is regulated in whole or 
in part by long-standing international conventions in force specifically relating 
to such straits. ,, 103 During the course of the negotiations in UNCLOS m, various 
delegates suggested that this exception would apply to the Straits of the 
Dardanelles and Bosporus (Turkey) , I04 the Strait of Magellan (Argentina and 
Chile,) IOS the Belts and Sound (Sweden-Denmark,) I06 and the Aaland Strait 
(Sweden-Finland) . 107 
A detailed examination of each of these Conventions is beyond the scope of 
this paper. Dr. Rauch, however, raises the question in his monograph as to 
whether all of these straits are actually "regulated" by the Conventions referred 
to in the footnotes so as to qualify for exemption from the transit-passage 
regime. Although acknowledging that at least two leading international 
authorities in the field disagree with him as to the Danish Straits and the Strait 
of Magellan, he concludes, based on the analysis therein as well as his prior 
works to which he refers, that except for the Turkish Straits, "would-be 
claimants to Art. 35(c) status simply fail to make a credible case.,,108 The United 
States ' manual, though not explicitly excluding other treaty-regime straits, 
mentions only the Turkish Straits as being entitled to this exception to the 
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f '  109 regime 0 transit passage. 
In the case of the Turkish Straits, in time of war, Turkey being a neutral, the 
Montreux Convention provides for freedom of transit for neutral warships but 
prohibits passage of belligerent warships except under certain exceptional 
circumstances delineated in the Convention. If Turkey is at war, Turkey has 
complete discretion as to the transit of warships. 1 10 
C. The Contiguous Zone. As discussed above, l l l  the contiguous zone is an 
area of limited jurisdiction. The competence of the coastal State in this zone is 
limited to the exercise of the control necessary to prevent infringement of the 
coastal State's customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitary regulations within its 
territory or territorial sea. J l2 The International Law Commission explicitly 
refused to recognize special security rights for the contiguous zone, and the 
1958 and 1982 Conventions adopted the ILC's fonnula. 1 1 3  The contiguous zone 
is, for all intents and purposes, the equivalent of the high seas insofar as the 
conduct of hostile operations by belligerents and the exercise of belligerent or 
neutral rights and obligations are concerned. Thus, the extension of the outer 
limit of the contiguous zone from its fonner distance of twelve miles from the 
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baseline to twenty-four nautical miles as provided by article 33 of the 1982 LOS 
Convention should not be of any significance in the application of the law of 
anned conflict at sea. 
The contiguous zone is, of course, overlapped by the exclusive economic 
zone and the continental shelf. Insofar as the rules of anned conflict may be 
affected by the creation of these latter juridical areas in the oceans, which will 
be discussed below, those same effects would be felt in the contiguous zone. 
D. The Exclusive Economic Zone. The adoption of the concept of an exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ) in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention represents the 
culmination of a long-continued effort by some segments of the international 
community to separate "jurisdiction" over the natural resources of offshore 
waters from "sovereignty" manifest in the territorial sea. As stated earlier, 1 14 
by virtue of the territorial sea owing its origin to the law of neutrality, its 
"application to the right of fishing is accidental." In the words of Dr. Rauch, 
" [The EEZ] is the synthesis of the fisheries zone, epicontinental sea, patrimonial 
sea, and the continental shelf concept which started with the Truman Proclama­
tion of 1945. ,, 1 15 
Although the coastal State exercises "sovereign rights" over the EEZ for the 
purpose of exploring and exploiting, managing and conserving its living and 
non-living resources and "jurisdiction" to the extent provided in the Convention 
with regard to the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and 
structures, marine scientific research, and the protection and preservation of the 
marine environment, 1 1 6 it is clear that the EEZ is not incorporated into the 
territorial regime of the coastal State as are internal waters and the territorial 
sea. 1 1 7 Reinforcing the distinction between the territorial sea and the exclusive 
economic zone is paragraph 2 of Article 58, which states, "Articles 88 to 1 15 
[from the High Seas Part of the Convention] and other pertinent rules of 
international law apply to the exclusive economic zone in so far as they are not 
incompatible with this Part." Article 89, which is among those articles so 
incorporated into the exclusive-economic-zone Part of the Convention, states, 
"No State may validly purport to subject any part of the high seas to its 
sovereignty ... 
Whether one considers the EEZ as part of the high seas, as some authorities 
contend, or as an area that is sui generis, as contended by others,1 1 8 it is clear 
that it is a zone that is neither territorial nor has wholly the characteristics of 
high seas. It is a zone in which competences are allocated to coastal States on 
the one hand and all other States on the other so as to balance the need of the 
coastal State to have sufficient authority to exploit and manage the economic 
resources (article 56 ( 1 )) against the need of all other States to retain high seas 
navigation and communications freedoms and uses related to such freedoms 
(article 58 ( 1 )) .  Article 58( 1 )  describes these high-seas freedoms as follows: 
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1 .  In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or land-lock­
ed, enjoy, subject to the relevant provisions of this Convention, the freedoms 
referred to in article 87 of navigation and overflight and of the laying of 
submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the 
sea related to these freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of 
ships, aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines, and compatible with the 
other provisions of this Convention. 
As stated by Elliot Richardson, the United States Ambassador to UNCLOS 
Ill: 
In the group which negotiated this language it was understood that the 
freedoms in question . . .  must be qualitatively and quantitatively the same as 
the traditional high-seas freedoms recognized by international law: they must 
be qualitatively the same in the sense that the nature and extent of the right 
is the same as the traditional high-seas freedoms; they must be quantitatively 
the same in the sense that the included uses of the sea must embrace a range 
no less complete-and allow for future uses no less inclusive-than tradi­
tional high-seas freedoms, l l9 
Except for the freedom of fishing, freedom of scientific research, and 
freedom to construct artificial islands and other installations which are related 
to the exploration and exploitation of the resources of the EEZ, the freedoms 
are identical to those enumerated in article 87 as applicable in the high seas. 
Although article 58 is not open-ended, as is article 87 in which the enumeration 
of high seas freedoms is preceded by the term inter alia, the addition of the 
phrase "and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these 
freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft and 
submarine cables and pipelines" in article 58 seems to serve the same pur­
pose. 120 The balance between the rights of coastal States and other States in the 
EEZ is also reflected in the paragraphs of articles 56 and 58 which require both 
coastal States (article 56(2» and other States (article 58(3» to have "due regard" 
to the rights and duties of "other" States and coastal States respectively. 
In assessing this balance and applying it to the operations of warships in the 
exclusive economic zone, Professor Oxman concluded as follows: 
[W]arships in principle enjoy freedom to carry out their military missions 
under the regime of the high seas subject to three basic obligations: ( 1 )  the 
duty to refrain from the unlawful threat or use of force; (2) the duty to have 
"due regard" to the rights of others to use the sea; and (3) the duty to observe 
applicable obligations under other treaties or rules of international law. The 
same requirements apply in the exclusive economic zone, with the addition 
of an obligation to have "due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal 
State" in the exclusive economic zone. 12 1  
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Although Oxman was concerned explicitly only with peacetime rights, his 
conclusion is equally applicable in time of anned conflict as well. The juridical 
nature of the zone does not change with the transition from peace to war. 122 
There is thus no basis for concluding that, except for the duty to have due regard 
to the rights of the coastal State for the exploitation of the economic resources 
of the zone, the conduct of hostilities by belligerent States in the exclusive 
economic zone of a neutral State is subject to greater restraints than is their 
conduct on the high seas. Clearly, there is no basis for concluding from the 
tenns of the LOS Convention that the EEZ is to be equated to the territorial sea 
insofar as the application of the rules of neutrality are concerned. 
Nevertheless, there have been suggestions from States and in the literature 
that some States may regard the regime of the EEZ as encompassing the right 
of coastal States to control military operations in the EEZ. The earliest sugges­
tion to this effect which I have discovered was published anonymously in the 
official journal of the Swedish Navy in 1974, and is quoted in English transla­
tion in Dr. Rauch's monograph as follows: 
For Sweden it is of great interest to prevent, that other States use our exclusive 
economic zone for the deployment of nuclear weapons. The coastal State has 
to make sure that this does not happen . . . .  In times of war the neutral State 
has the obligation under the 1907 Convention to protect its merchant navy 
and those of other States against military operations. The neutral State is also 
obliged to prevent the use of its sea territory by a belligerent as a base for 
naval operations against the adverse party. The rights and duties layed upon 
the coastal States in the exclusive economic zone will also have to be fulfilled 
in situations where the coastal State remains neutral in a war between third 
powers. The protection of neutrality in this case is evidently-in whole or in 
part-extended to the exclusive zone. 1 2l 
At several times during the negotiation of the Law of the Sea Convention, the 
delegate of Sweden made statements concerning the relevance of the Conven­
tion to the law of neutrality as expressed in Hague XIII. 124 Although the 
connection between the anonymous article and the official statements of the 
Government of Sweden is not readily apparent, Dr. Rauch raises them as a 
matter of concern. 
Dr. Rauch analyzes several bases on which a claim might be made that the 
neutrality rules of Hague XIII applicable to the territorial sea were also 
applicable to the EEZ. One is the similarity of language in Hague XIII and the 
LOS Convention. While acknowledging that the French text of the LOS 
Convention uses the tenns droit souverain and juridiction to describe the 
jurisdiction exercised by the coastal State in the EEZ, which are also the tenns 
used in the French text of Hague XIII (the only authentic text) ,  he does not 
conclude from this that "the new concept of the exclusive economic zone is 
nunc pro tunc to be included in the historical scope of application" of Hague 
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xm. In his view, it is clear that what was meant by the terms droit souverain 
andjuridiction in Hague XIII was maritime areas subject to the sovereignty of 
the State-in modern terms, the territorial sea and internal waters. 125 But Rauch 
does not stop at that point; he argues that if a State may not subject the EEZ to 
its sovereignty in time of peace, citing article 89, it "amounts to a clear 
prohibition in time of war to attempt to subject the exclusive economic zone to 
principles of neutrality," 126 since " [t]he starting point of the regulations ought 
to be the sovereignty of the neutral State. ,, 127 He concludes that "acts of hostility 
between belligerents can be committed in the exclusive economic zones of 
neutral States as a legitimate exercise of traditional rights under the law of 
war.,, 128 
While Dr. Rauch's conclusion would appear to be irrefutable, at least one 
other thread tying the EEZ to territorialist theories has appeared. At the fmal 
session of the Conference in Montego Bay, Jamaica, in 1 982, Brazil declared 
on its signing of the Convention that its government "understands that the 
provisions of the Convention do not authorize other States to carry out military 
exercises or manoeuvres within the exclusive economic zone, particularly when 
these activities involve the use of weapons or explosives, without the prior 
knowledge and consent of the coastal State. ,, 129 Similar statements have also 
been made by the governments of Cape Verdel30 and Uruguay. l3 l  These 
statements were contested by statements of the governments of Italy, France, 
and the United States, exercising the right of reply, 132 and have been rejected 
by Ambassador T.T.B. Koh, who was the President of UNCLOS ill during the 
latter part of the Conference, 133 as well as by Barbara Kwiatkowska in her 
treatise on the EEZ. I 34  
In addition to i ts  assertions concerning military maneuvers i n  the EEZ, Brazil 
also requested the Legal Committee of ICAO to hold that the rules of overflight 
of the EEZ were the same as for those over land territory and the territorial sea. 
The Legal Committee rejected this request, holding that such a position was 
totally incompatible with the provisions of the LOS Convention, which equate 
the EEZ with the high seas insofar as freedom of overflight is concerned. 135 
Although the positions stated by Brazil, Cape Verde, and Uruguay were 
directed explicitly to a peacetime situation, one may infer that they might be 
asserted with respect to the conduct of hostilities and other military operations 
in their exclusive economic zones in time of war. As already developed, this 
position cannot be supported by the terms of the LOS Convention. Nor is it 
supported by the three military manuals that have been examined. The Canadian 
Draft Military Manual provides explicitly in paragraph 703 that, "The general 
area within which the naval forces of belligerents are permitted to conduct 
operations involving the use of force includes: the high seas (including ex­
clusive economic zones) . . . .  ,, 136 The German Manual likewise provides, "[A]s 
a matter of principle acts of naval warfare may be performed as in the high seas 
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also in the exclusive economic zones of neutral or non-belligerent states ... 137 
Although the United States 's manual does not state the same proposition 
explicitly, it does so by negative implication by defining neutral territory as 
including only the neutral 's  land, internal waters, territorial sea, and ar­
chipelagic waters (if any) . 138 
From the foregoing analysis, it seems incontestable that, despite the asser­
tions of a few States and publicists, the exclusive economic zone may be equated 
to the high seas insofar as the application of the law of neutrality is concerned. 
Since the rights of the coastal State in the seabed of the EEZ are exercised in 
accordance with the continental-shelf Part of the LOS Convention, 139 discus­
sion of hostile military activities or placing of military devices on the seabed 
of the EEZ will be discussed below in the section on the continental shelf. 
E. The Continental Shelf. The continental shelf comprises the seabed and 
subsoil of a coastal State from the outer boundary of its territorial sea to the 
outer edge of the continental margin or, for coastal States with margins less 
than 200 miles, to the outer boundary of the exclusive economic zone. 140 For 
the few coastal States which have continental margins wider than 200 miles, 
the edge of the continental margin is determined by a complex formula 
contained in article 76 of the Convention which may extend the outer boundary 
to as much as 350 miles from the baseline or 100 miles beyond the 25OO-meter 
isobath. 
On the continental shelf the coastal State exercises "sovereign rights for the 
purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources. ,,14 1  Unlike the EEZ, 
however, the coastal State 's jurisdiction over the continental shelf does not 
extend to the water column or airspace above it, except insofar as is necessary 
to allow the coastal State to construct artificial structures on the continental 
shelf for the purpose of exploiting it and establishing reasonable safety zones 
around such structures. In this connection, the provisions of Article 60 of the 
EEZ Part of the Convention apply mutatis mutandis to the continental shelf. 142 
The Convention provides explicitly that "the rights of the coastal State over the 
continental shelf do not affect the legal status of the superjacent waters or of 
the air space above those waters" and that " [t]he exercise of the rights of the 
coastal State over the continental shelf must not infringe or result in any 
unjustifiable interference with navigation and other rights and freedoms of other 
States as provided for in this Convention ... 143 Conversely, by incorporation of 
article 60 by reference into the continental-shelf Part of the Convention, "All 
ships must respect these safety zones [around continental-shelf installations] 
and shall comply with generally accepted international standards regarding 
na vigation in the vicinity of artificial islands, installations, structures and safety 
zones." I44 Thus, the waters above the continental shelf are governed by the 
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regime of the exclusive economic zone insofar as they are within 200 miles of 
the baseline and by the regime of the high seas where they are beyond that limit. 
Since the continental shelf itself has a status different from the waters 
superjacent to it, it is appropriate to discuss acts of warfare that may be 
conducted in the water column separately from those that may be conducted on 
the seabed itself. 
1. Waters Superjacent to the Continental Shelf. As the previous discus­
sion of the exclusive economic zone has concluded, the waters of the EEZ have 
the same characteristics as those of the high seas with respect to the conduct of 
hostilities by belligerents therein and the application of the law of neutrality 
thereto, save only for the duty to have "due regard" for the rights of the coastal 
State in the zone. A fortiori the waters above the continental shelf beyond the 
exclusive economic zone are high seas in the strictest sense of that term and are 
not in any way different from other parts of the high seas with respect to 
belligerent activity save only the duty to respect the safety zones and comply 
with international standards regarding navigation in the vicinity of artificial 
islands, installations, structures, and safety zones. 145 Thus, the only restriction 
on the law of armed conflict at sea that would be made necessary by the 
emergence of the continental shelf as a defined area of the oceans is to 
incorporate cautionary notes concerning respect for and non-interference with 
legitimate activities and structures utilized by the coastal State for exploitation 
of the natural resources of the shelf. 
2. The Seabed of the Continental Shelf. Since the relevant articles of both 
the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention 146 and the LOS Convention147 recog­
nize that the coastal State exercises only "sovereign rights for the purpose of 
exploiting" the shelf and its resources, they visualize that other States may use 
the seabed of the shelf for other purposes not inconsistent with and not 
interfering with the coastal State's exclusive rights of exploitation of natural 
resources. Although India introduced a proposal at UNCLOS I that would have 
prohibited the building of military bases or installations on the continental shelf 
"by the coastal State or any other State," this proposal was defeated. 148 A similar 
proposal, but limiting the prohibition to States other than the coastal State, was 
put forth by Mexico and Kenya at an early stage of UNCLOS III. This proposal 
did not find its way into the negotiating texts nor the final Convention. 149 The 
negotiating history of the two most important international instruments would 
thus seem to suggest that, subject to the restrictions on the use of the seabed 
found in the Conventions themselves, emplacing weapons or other military 
devices on the seabed of the continental shelf, both within the 200-mile EEZ 
and beyond, is permissible as the exercise of a freedom of the high seas. 150 The 
military activities on the seabed of the continental shelf most often discussed 
are the laying of mines or cable arrays for underwater detection and surveil­
lance. 
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Article 60 of the LOS Convention, which is applicable to the continental 
shelf as well as to the EEZ, contains the relevant restrictions on the construction 
of installations on the seabed. It provides in part as follows: 
Article 60 
Artificial islands, installations and structures in the 
exclusive economic zone 
1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State shall have the ex­
. clusive right to construct and to authorize and regulate the construction, 
operation and use of: 
(a) artificial islands; 
(b) installations and structures for the purposes provided in article 56 
and other economic purposes; 
(c) instal lations and structures which may interfere with the exercise of 
the rights of the coastal State in the zone. 
2. The coastal State shall have exclusive jurisdiction over such artificial 
islands, installations and structures, including jurisdiction with regard to 
customs, fiscal, health, safety and immigration laws and regulations. 
3. Due notice must be given of the construction of such artificial islands, 
installations or structures . . .  
4. The coastal State may, where necessary, establish reasonable safety 
zones around such artificial islands, installations and structures . . .  
6. All ships must respect these safety zones . . .  
7. Artificial islands, installations and structures and the safety zones 
around them may not be established where interference may be caused to the 
use of recognized sea lanes essential to international navigation. 
(Emphasis supplied) 
A careful reading of the quoted portion of Article 60 reveals that a coastal 
State may regulate (under a reasonable interpretation this would also include 
"prohibit") the construction, operation, and use of artificial islands whatever 
their purposes, other installations and structures whose purposes are the 
economic exploration or exploitation of the EEZ or continental shelf, and those 
installations erected by others which may interfere with the rights of the coastal 
State in the zone. In other words, a coastal State has the exclusive right to 
construct and regulate artificial islands in the EEZ and on the continental shelf. 
But it does not have the right to regulate or prohibit installations and structures 
other than artificial islands unless they are for an economic purpose or would 
interfere with the coastal State 's right to economic exploitation of the zone or 
shelf. In addition, neither the coastal State nor any other State may construct or 
operate structures or installations where they wil l  interfere with navigation 
(para. 6), and other States must respect the safety zones established by the 
coastal State. Furthermore, the constructing State need not give notice of such 
installations or structures unless they are of such a type that their location or 
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operation "may interfere with the exercise of the rights of the coastal State" 
(para. 3). Of course, the State other than the coastal State engaging in such 
activities must abide by the requirements of "due regard" for the rights of the 
coastal State and for the interests of all States in their exercise of the freedoms 
of the high seas. 
Under the foregoing interpretation, which is believed to be the correct one, 
there is no prohibition against States other than the coastal State employing or 
emplacing weapons or detection devices on the seabed of the EEZ or continental 
shelf if they would not interfere with the coastal State's exploitation of the 
resources of the EEZ or continental shelf and if they are in compliance with the 
explicit restrictions contained in article 60. 15 1 
Although the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, 152 the Seabed Treaty of 
197 1 , 153 and the Tlatelolco Treaty of 1967 154 contain certain restrictions on the 
emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in 
some areas of the seabed, I have not included a discussion of their provisions, 
since the subjects of those treaties are beyond the scope of this paper. 
F. Archipelagic Waters. Under the traditional law of the sea, and under most 
circumstances in the 1982 LOS Convention, islands are treated in the same 
manner as mainlands with respect to the drawing of baselines and delimitation 
of the territorial sea and other coastal zones. The 1982 Convention, however, 
recognized a special exception in the case of archipelagic States, which are 
permitted to draw archipelagic baselines enclosing a newly recognized category 
of waters-archipelagic waters. 
Archipelagic waters are created when an archipelagic State meeting the 
qualifications of article 47 of the LOS Convention draws archipelagic baselines 
joining the outermost points of the outermost islands and drying reefs of the 
archipelago. The waters enclosed thereby are denominated "archipelagic 
waters." 
The terms of article 47 permit archipelagic baselines to be as much as 100 
nautical miles long, with up to three percent of the total number of baselines as 
much as 125 miles in length. As can be seen by examining a map of Indonesia, 
which is the archetypical archipelagic State, adoption of archipelagic baselines 
can create archipelagic waters of enormous proportions. Indonesia stretches 
approximately 3,000 miles east to west and almost 1 ,000 miles north to south. 
Indonesia's archipelagic baselines are over 8,000 miles in length and enclose 
some 666,000 square nautical miles of ocean space. They also encompass the 
important straits of Sunda, Sumba, Lombok, Ombai, Molucca, and Macassar 
as well as a number of important internal passages within the archipelago. 155 
The sovereignty of the archipelagic State extends to all waters enclosed by 
archipelagic baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast 
(article 49) .  The sovereignty also extends to the airspace above and the bed and 
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subsoil of the archipelagic waters. Essentially, the only limitations on the 
sovereignty of the archipelagic State over archipelagic waters are the rights 
preserved in all other States ( 1 )  to archipelagic sea-lanes passage and air routes 
through archipelagic sea-lanes as defIned by the archipelagic State, or if none 
are designated then through the routes normally used for international naviga­
tion (article 53), and (2) to innocent passage through other areas of archipelagic 
waters (article 52). Within archipelagic waters, archipelagic States may draw 
closing lines for the delimitation of internal waters in accordance with the rules 
for drawing baselines for the territorial sea (article 50) . The archipelagic State's 
territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf 
extend outward from the archipelagic baselines. 
1. Archipelagic Waters Outside of Archipelagic Sea-Lanes. The legal 
character of archipelagic waters is essentially identical to that of the territorial 
sea. On this basis Dr. Rauch concludes without serious discussion that "bel­
ligerents in future will have to respect archipelagic waters the same way as they 
have to respect the territorial sea of the coastal State." IS6 The United States 
manual adopts the same conclusion, although it precedes it with a cautionary 
statement, as follows: 
The balance of neutral and belligerent rights and duties with respect to 
neutral waters is, however, at its most unsettled in the context of archipelagic 
waters. 
Belligerent forces must refrain from acts of hostility in neutral archipelagic 
waters and from using them as a sanctuary or a base of operations. m 
In its chapter on the rights and duties of neutral powers, the Canadian draft 
manual likewise equates archipelagic waters of a neutral State to the territorial 
sea of such a State, stating: 
1 .  Neutral waters are the inland waters, internal waters, territorial seas 
and, where applicable, archipelagic seas of states which are not participants 
in an international armed conflict. . . .  
2. Any act of hostility, as, for example, the seizure of or attack upon an 
enemy vessel within neutral waters is a breach of neutrality and as such is 
forbidden. I�8 
In the chapter on conduct of hostilities at sea, however, in the paragraph entitled 
"General Area of Naval Warfare," the Draft Manual does not include ar­
chipelagic waters of belligerents in the recitation of areas of the sea open to the 
conduct of hostilities. That paragraph provides: 
1 .  The general area within which the naval forces of belligerents are 
permitted to conduct operations involving the use of force includes: the high 
seas (including exclusive economic zones), the territorial sea and internal 
3 1  
The Newport Papers 
waters of belligerents, the territory of belligerents accessible to naval forces, 
and the air space over such waters and territories. 1 59 
These apparent inconsistencies undoubtedly reflect the fact that the Canadian 
Manual is still in draft fonn and will be addressed in the review process. 160 
Although the Gennan Manual states that archipelagic waters of the parties 
to the conflict are legitimate areas for the perfonnance of acts of naval 
warfare,161 its chapter l I on the law of neutrality refers only to the "territorial 
waters" of neutrals. 162 In paragraph 10 12 of the preceding chapter on anned 
conflict at sea, however, the Manual states that "The rights of coastal and 
archipelagic states must . . . be taken into due consideration." The Gennan 
Manual, like the Canadian one, is also in draft fonn and subject to further 
revision. 
What has been said above with respect to the effects of the broadening of the 
territorial sea as a result of the adoption of a twelve-mile breadth and the 
liberalization and abuse of straight baselines 163 applies with even more vigor 
to archipelagic waters. If, in a situation in which an archipelagic State such as 
Indonesia is a neutral, these vast areas of archipelagic waters which were 
fonnerly high seas are to be removed from the area open to the conduct of naval 
hostilities and to become "neutral waters" with all the consequences that that 
tenn implies, both for the rights and obligations of neutral States as well as to 
the belligerent States, one may wonder whether either neutrals or belligerents 
will be able to live up to their obligations. If the narrow Norwegian territorial 
sea was a "covered way" enabling Gennan submarines to transit to and from 
the high seas sheltered from attack by British naval and air forces, l 64  neutral 
archipelagic waters could become a vast, protected superhighway providing a 
tempting haven for escape from attack and as a secret base for operations. The 
vastness of such waters certainly renders dubious the so-called twenty-four­
hour rule of Hague xm165 and increases manifold the burdens imposed on a 
neutral State by the obligation to exercise surveillance of its neutral waters. l66 
This is  true whether the archipelagic State chooses to allow belligerent warships 
to continue to exercise the right of "mere passage" through its archipelagic 
waters or deny such passage, as would be pennitted if archipelagic waters are 
analogized to the territorial sea in this respect. 167 In either event, the burdens 
of surveillance and enforcement on the neutral State would be heavy, and the 
neutral 's  failure or inability to live up to these obligations would be likely to 
embroil it in the conflict. This danger is recognized in the United States manual ,  
which provides : 
The neutral archipelagic nation has an affinnative duty to police its ar­
chipelagic waters to ensure that the inviolability of its neutral waters is 
respected. If a neutral nation is unable or unwilling effectively to detect and 
expel belligerent forces unlawfully present in its archipelagic waters, the 
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opposing belligerent may undertake such self-help enforcement actions as 
may be necessary to terminate the violation of neutrality. Such self-help 
enforcement may include surface, subsurface, and air penetration of ar­
chipelagic waters and airspace and the use of proportional force as neces­
sary.l68 
2. Archipelagic Sea-Lanes and Archipelagic Sea-Lane Passage. The 
waters of archipelagic sea-lanes and the airspace above them are subject to a 
different navigation regime than are archipelagic waters outside such sea-lanes. 
An archipelagic State may not deny to ships and aircraft of other States the right 
of archipelagic sea-lane passage through its archipelagic waters in time of 
peace. 169 In designating such passages, which will normally be fifty nautical 
miles in width, the archipelagic State must include for ships "all normal 
navigational channels." 1 70 If the archipelagic State fails to make such designa­
tions, "the right of archipelagic sea-lanes passage may be exercised through the 
routes normally used for international navigation. ,, 1 7 1  As previously stated, 
archipelagic sea-lanes passage, in legal terms, is essentially identical to transit 
passage through straits. 172 In exercising their rights of archipelagic sea-lanes 
passage, foreign ships and aircraft may proceed in their "normal mode" but only 
for the purpose of "continuous, expeditious and unobstructed transit between 
one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the 
high seas or an exclusive economic zone,', 173 and they must observe the same 
types of rules and regulations that are applicable in transit passage through 
straits. 174 
Since transit passage and archipelagic sea-lanes passage are to all intents and 
purposes legally identical, the same logic which compelled the conclusion that 
in time of war belligerent warships and military aircraft may exercise the right 
of transit passage through neutral straits would lead to the same conclusion with 
respect to archipelagic sea-lanes passage through archipelagic sea-lanes. 
This conclusion is accepted by the United States manual, which states that: 
Belligerent ships or aircraft, including submarines, surface warships, and 
military aircraft retain the right of unimpeded archipelagic sea lanes passage 
through, over, and under neutral archipelagic sea lanes. Belligerent forces 
exercising the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage may engage in those 
activities that are incident to their normal mode of continuous and expeditious 
passage and consistent with their security. m 
The Canadian Manual does not deal with archipelagic sea-lane passage 
separately but rather couples it with transit passage, as follows : 
Warships and military aircraft of a belligerent state may exercise the right of 
transit passage, that is, of essentially unimpeded passage or overflight in an 
appropriate state of readiness with appropriate sensors activated, through 
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certain straits where the transit passage [regime?] applies or through ar­
chipelagic sea lanes.176 
In interpreting what the United States manual means when it states "activities 
that are incident to their normal mode," one needs to tum to the provisions of 
the manual dealing with transit passage through neutral straits, where it is stated: 
Belligerent forces in transit may . . .  take defensive measures consistent with 
their security, including the launching and recovery of aircraft, screen forma­
tion steaming, and acoustic and electronic surveillance. I n  
Although archipelagic sea-lanes passage through archipelagic waters may 
be the legal equivalent of transit passage through straits, geographical factors 
may create large differences in practical effect. A strait is usually a geographical 
phenomenon of small dimensions, usually only a few miles from entrance to 
exit, requiring only a few hours, at most, for passage. 1 78 Usually there is only 
one entrance and one exit. 1 79 On the other hand, taking Indonesia as the prime 
example, archipelagic waters include vast areas, with numerous internal straits 
and passages, dictating multiple, intersecting archipelagic sea-lanes. A naval 
ship or formation entering at one extremity of the archipelago and steaming at 
a wartime cruising speed of twenty knots, for example, would require over six 
days to traverse its entire East-to-West dimension using the most direct route. 
The ship or formation could, through the use of intersecting archipelagic 
sea-lanes, emerge at any of a number of exits, shielded the entire time from air, 
surface, or submarine attack from enemy forces. One may question whether it 
is reasonable to assume that an enemy force would accept the traditional 
restraints on hostile activities (which presumably would include surveillance) 
for passage of such great span and duration. 
3. Concluding Remarks Concerning Archipelagic Waters. It is apparent 
from the foregoing discussion that of the "new zones" recognized in the 1982 
LOS Convention, archipelagic waters present the most difficult issues. In a 
paper prepared for delivery soon after the close of UNCLOS ill, Rear Admiral 
Bruce Harlow, a vice-chairman of the United States delegation to that Con­
ference, posed a number of questions concerning the impact archipelagic waters 
would have on the law of neutrality. He stated: 
What then is the solution? When a neutral cannot or will not take mean­
ingful measures to preclude potential violations, may a belligerent step in and 
undertake the mission of verifying that neutral waters are free of the enemy? 
Or would this contravene the traditional rule of inviolability of neutral 
sovereignty? If a departure from this rule were permitted for surveillance 
missions, would such missions have to be identified so that they would not 
be confused with prohibited belligerent operations? If the surveil­
lance/verification mission detected a violator, would the matter have to be 
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referred to the neutral for action, or could those engaged in surveillance attack 
the violator pursuant to their belligerent right to take corrective measures 
against known violations? What would happen if two opposing surveillance 
forces met? May aircraft be used for surveillance/verification missions 
despite the traditional prohibition on overflight of sovereign waters? What 
standard would justify initiation of surveillance/verification missions: in the 
discretion of the belligerent; upon a reasonable determination that the enemy 
might use neutral waters; upon determination that the enemy was using 
neutral waters? What would be the impact of a pattern of prior abuses without 
evidence of a present violation? Would a different standard apply for a neutral 
archipelagic state that was willing, but plainly unable, to take actions that 
would effectively ensure that neutrality violations were precluded, than in the 
case of another neutral whose words or deeds demonstrated a clear unwill­
ingness, regardless of the level of its capabilities?180 
Except for Dr. Rauch's monograph, Admiral Harlow 's ruminations, and the 
United States Manual, it would appear that the relationship between the status 
of archipelagic waters and the law of armed conflict at sea (including the law 
of neutrality), is largely unexamined in the published legal literature. 18 1  As can 
be seen from the foregoing discussion, archipelagic waters pose the most 
difficult problems for a mechanical application of traditional rules of naval 
warfare and neutrality to the zones created in the "new" law of the sea. It is 
submitted that it is unlikely for the traditional rules to survive unchanged in the 
event of a naval conflict in which archipelagic waters of significant dimensions 
come into play, either as neutral waters or waters of either belligerent party. 
G. The Area. According to the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
the "Area" is "the sea-bed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits 
of national jurisdiction.,, 1 82 In effect, this means that the seabed beyond the 
outer edge of the continental shelf of any State comprises the Area. The legal 
status of the waters superjacent to the Area and the airspace above those waters 
is not affected by the creation of the Area. 183 In essence, the freedoms of the 
high seas apply to these waters and airspace. 
Part XI of the Convention, which governs activities in the Area, including 
the regime for exploration and exploitation of its resources, is the most con­
troversial Part of the Convention. Unlike those Parts of the Convention 
heretofore discussed in this Report, Part XI has not been regarded as reflective 
of customary international law. 1 84 The United States and several other States 
of the developed world have assigned as their reason for refusal to become 
parties to the Convention the unacceptability of Part XI, and some have enacted 
interim deep-sea mining codes that permit exploitation of the seabed beyond 
national jurisdiction under national laws. 1 8S Nevertheless, even those States 
which have refused to accept the detailed regime for mining the deep seabed 
contained in Part XI accept the fact that whether the resources of the deep seabed 
35 
The Newport Papers 
are developed in accordance with Part XI or some successor regime or in 
accordance with national laws, no State may claim or exercise sovereignty over 
the seabed and subsoil beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. 186 For that 
reason it is appropriate to include a paragraph or two about the implications of 
the existence of such an area for the law of armed conflict at sea. For the sake 
of convenience, it will be referred to as the " Area," even though that term is not 
accepted by those States who object to Part XI of the Convention. 
Since the Area includes only the seabed, ocean floor, and subsoil thereof, 
the only foreseeable impact it might have on hostile activities in the water 
column and airspace above it is in the possible interference between the 
platforms and other gear used by those who may be engaged in activities 
exploiting the seabed (presumably neutrals) and belligerents engaging in hostile 
activities against each other. With respect to such possible interferences, the 
LOS Convention provides that the freedoms of the high seas "shall be exercised 
by all States with due regard for the interests of other States in their exercise of 
the freedom of the high seas, and also with due regard/or the rights under this 
Convention with respect to activities in the Area. ,, 1 87 
The creation of the " Area," whatever form it may ultimately take, should 
thus have no more impact on the conduct of armed hostilities on the high seas 




Although aU weapon systems and platforms are affected by the principles 
and considerations which have been addressed above, naval mines are probably 
the most acutely affected, since, except for rarely used unanchored mines, they 
are usually laid in shallow waters, placing them within one of the zones subject 
to coastal state jurisdiction. It is thus appropriate to include comments explicitly 
directed to mine warfare in addition to the general discussion above in section 
V.E. pertaining to the continental shelf. 
Hague Convention (VIII) Relative to the Laying of Automatic Contact Mines 
is the only treaty law governing the emplacement and employment of naval 
mines. 1 88 Hague VIII contains no geographical limitations on where mines may 
be employed other than the rather vague geographical term "off the coast and 
ports of the enemy" in Article 2 and "off their coasts" (referring to neutral 
coasts) in article 4. As pointed out by Professor Howard Levie in his recent 
book, Mine Waifare at Sea, 1 89 articles originally proposed by the British 
delegation to the Hague Conference would have limited the laying of anchored 
automatic submarine contact mines beyond three nautical miles from the 
low-water mark along the whole extent of the coasts of belligerent states 
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(friendly and enemy) with an extension allowed to ten nautical miles off 
defended ports. l90 Because of what Professor Levie describes as "strange 
twists" in negotiation and parliamentary complications, 19 1  all references to 
geographical limitations (other than the two mentioned above) were dropped 
from the Convention. The negotiation thus focused on restrictions on minelay­
ing generally applicable, regardless of area. The result was, as stated by Sir 
Ernest Satow, the British delegate, that "the Convention as adopted imposes 
upon the belligerent no restriction as to the placing of anchored mines, which 
consequently may be laid wherever the belligerent chooses, in his own waters 
for self-defense, in the waters of the enemy as a means of attack, or finally on 
the high seas, . . . .. 192 
A proposal by the Dutch delegation which would have prohibited the laying 
of mines so as to bar passage through straits met a similar fate. 193 Rather than 
include an article on straits, the final report of the Third Commission merely 
included a statement that: 
[T]he committee decided unanimously to suppress all provisions relating to 
straits, which should be left out of the discussion in the present Conference. 
It was clearly understood that under the stipulations of the Convention to be 
concluded nothing whatever has been changed as regards the actual status of 
straits. 194 
After examining the practice of States in all conflicts since the adoption of 
Hague VIII in 1907, Professor Levie concludes that: 
[T]oday the practice of nations is that there is only one geographical limitation 
on belligerent minelaying-they may not be laid in the territorial sea or inland 
waters of neutrals. 1 9' 
It should be remembered, however, that during most of the period covered by 
Professor Levie's study, the breadth of the territorial sea was generally regarded 
as extending only three nautical miles from baselines which were almost 
uniformly drawn along the low-water mark of the coast line. 
As developed in sections V.D. and E. above, the special economic and 
resource jurisdiction exercised by States in their EEZ<; and continental shelves 
does not prohibit the emplacement or employment of weapons (including 
mines) on the seabed or in the waters of the EEZ and continental shelf unless 
they would interfere with the coastal State's exploitation of the resources of the 
EEZ or the continental shelf. On the other hand, coastal States exercise full 
sovereignty over their internal waters, the territorial sea, and archipelagic 
waters. The territorial sea is subject to the right of innocent passage, and where 
it embraces a strait used for international navigation, also to the regime of transit 
passage. Archipelagic waters are subject to the right of innocent passage, and 
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in archipelagic sea-lanes (where none are designated, the routes nonnally used 
for international navigation) , to the right of archipelagic sea-lane passage. In 
principle, then, the same rules should apply to expanded territorial seas and to 
archipelagic waters as applied to the territorial sea prior to its increase in breadth 
to twelve nautical miles. Likewise, since archipelagic sea-lanes passage is 
substantially identical to transit passage through international straits, in prin­
ciple, the rules for mining archipelagic sea-lanes should be the same as those 
for international straits. As we saw in Section V., however, rules applicable to 
a narrow territorial sea or a strait of limited geographical dimension may have 
a substantially different effect when applied to areas having the same legal 
characteristics but of vastly different geographical size. Nevertheless, the 
military manuals and draft manuals that have been examined (U.S. ,  Canada, 
Gennany), appear to accept the same rules for the mining of expanded territorial 
seas and archipelagic waters as previously have applied to internal waters and 
the territorial sea. The United States Manual states: 
9.2.2 Peacetime Mining. Consistent with the safety of its own citizenry, a 
nation may emplace both armed and controlled mines1\l6 in its own internal 
waters at any time with or without notification. A nation may also mine its 
own archipelagic waters and territorial sea during peacetime when deemed 
necessary for national security purposes. If armed mines are emplaced in 
archipelagic waters or the territorial sea, appropriate international notification 
of the existence and location of such mines is required. l97 Because the right 
of innocent passage can be suspended only temporarily, armed mines must 
be removed or rendered harmless as soon as the security threat that prompted 
their emplacement has terminated. Emplacement of controlled mines in a 
nation's own archipelagic waters or territorial sea is not subject to such 
notification or removal requirements. 
Naval mines may not be emplaced in the internal, territorial, or archipelagic 
waters of another nation in peacetime without that nation' s consent. Control­
led mines, however, may be emplaced in international waters beyond the 
territorial sea subject only to the requirement that they do not unreasonably 
interfere with other lawful uses of the oceans . . . .  
9.2.3. Mining During Armed Conflict. Naval mines may be lawfully 
employed by parties to an armed conflict subject to the following restrictions: 
2. Mines may not be emplaced by belligerents in neutral waters. 198 
6. Naval mines may be employed to channelize neutral shipping, but 
not in a manner to impede the transit passage of international 
straits or archipelagic sea lanes passage of archipelagic waters by 
such shipping. 
8 .  Mining of areas of indefinite extent in international waters is 
prohibited. Reasonably limited barred areas may be established 
by naval mines, provided neutral shipping retains an alternate 
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route around or through such an area with reasonable assurance 
of safety. 
The Canadian Manual's paragraph on naval mines contains no reference to 
geographic limitations, confming itself to quoting verbatim Articles 1 through 
3 of Hague VII. l99 One must determine geographic limitations for mining by 
turning to other provisions of the Manual dealing with areas of operations2OO 
and defining neutral waters.2°1 The former of these permits the conduct of 
operations using force (presumably including mines) on the high seas (includ­
ing EEZs) and the territorial sea and internal waters of belligerents. The latter 
forbids acts of hostility within neutral waters, which are defined as the inland 
waters, internal waters, territorial seas, and archipelagic seas of States which 
are not participants in the international armed conflict. It thus appears that while 
the Canadian Manual would prohibit the laying of mines in neutral archipelagic 
waters, it takes no position as to whether a belligerent may mine an opposing 
belligerent's archipelagic waters. It is also silent as to whether any particular 
restrictions apply with regard to mining international straits. 
The German Manual deals with naval mines in both a peacetime and wartime 
environment and in the context of protective, defensive and offensive mining, 
which it defines as follows: 
In laying mines the following kinds are distinguished: 
protective mining, i.e., laying mines in friendly territorial and internal 
waters. 
defensive mining, i .e.,  laying mines in international waters for the 
protection of passages, ports and their entrances. 
offensive mining, i.e., laying mines in hostile territorial and internal 
waters or in waters predominantly controlled by the adversary.202 
The Manual contains no explicit provisions against mining of neutral waters, 
but the paragraph on Scope of Application of the rules states that 
[T]he space in which acts of naval warfare within the meaning of paragraph 
1014 may be performed comprises: 
the territory of the parties to the conflict accessible for naval forces. 
the internal waters, the archipelagic waters and the territorial sea of the 
parties to the conflict. 
the high seas, and 
the airspace over these land and sea areas?OJ 
Peculiarly, paragraph 1014 does not include "mining" as one of the acts of 
naval warfare, nor, for that matter, does it include attacking or sinking of enemy 
warships. Presumably these ambiguities will be clarified upon further revision 
of the Draft Manual . Assuming, for the purpose of the discussion, however, that 
the limitations in the "Scope of Application" paragraph are meant to apply to 
mine warfare, it would appear that the German Draft Manual would equate the 
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archipelagic waters of belligerent parties to the territorial sea and would 
authorize their mining under the same rules that would apply to the territorial 
sea. 
The foregoing discussion suggests that neither the conventional law of mine 
warfare nor the customary practice of States has provided very clear guidelines 
as to the geographical limits of the employment of mines in naval conflict. The 
only settled principles are that in the era of the three-mile territorial sea it was 
lawful for a belligerent to employ mines in its own and its enemy's territorial 
sea and internal waters and that it was unlawful to employ them in the territorial 
sea and internal waters of a neutral State. Although there have been attempts to 
preserve freedom of navigation through international straits, and the United 
States Manual states that it is unlawful to lay mines "in a manner to impede the 
transit passage of international straits, .. 204 Professor Levie's study concludes 
that passage through straits "has been barred by mines in past conflicts and 
undoubtedly will be again in the future . .. 205 
Archipelagic waters present an even more difficult problem. As discussed 
earlier, they are subject to the full sovereignty of the archipelagic State and in 
their legal characteristics are substantially identical to the territorial sea. Tech­
nically, then, the same principles that govern the mining of the territorial sea, 
whether of a neutral or a belligerent, should govern the archipelagic waters, and 
by the same rationale, the principles applicable to international straits should 
apply to archipelagic sea-lanes. Either expressly or impliedly, the three service 
manuals examined seem to accept these consequences. Whether this makes 
sense and will fonn a basis for an effective regime in time of conflict seems 
open to question. The vast areas encompassed with archipelagic waters and the 
great lengths of some archipelagic sea-lanes would suggest that rule-makers 
should be careful not to create rules that will be honored more in their breach 
than in their observance. 
VII 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
The emergence of a "new" peacetime regime for the oceans, with its 
expansion of existing zones subject to national jurisdiction and the creation of 
new zones also subject to the same or similar fonns of jurisdiction, has created 
problems of adaptation of the traditional rules of anned conflict at sea to these 
new developments. As has been found in the foregoing analysis, the current 
national manuals which have been examined (U.S . ,  Canadian and Gennan) 
have adopted rules for the conduct of warfare in these new and expanded zones 
that are identical to those that were applicable prior to their expansion (L e. , the 
twelve-mile territorial sea) or have adopted by analogy the same rules for newly 
created areas that were applicable to zones of much smaller dimension that in 
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peacetime have the same legal characteristics (i. e. , archipelagic waters) . As has 
been suggested by the foregoing analysis, however, the geographic and opera­
tional factors that determine the nature and scope of naval operations in time 
of armed conflict, and, in particular, the relationships between belligerent and 
neutral forces, render it uncertain as to whether such mechanical application of 
prior rules to new or expanded areas of national jurisdiction serves the best 
interests of either neutrals or belligerents or the humanitarian objectives of the 
rules. Massive expansions of waters that are denied to belligerents for hostile 
operations and for which neutral States have burdensome duties of surveillance 
and control are likely to increase beyond belligerents' power to resist the 
temptation to violate such waters and to overtax the capabilities of neutral States 
to enforce their duties within them. The result may well be increased tension 
between neutral and belligerent States with the consequent danger of widening 
the area of conflict and drawing neutral States into it. 
Admittedly, I have not been able to propose a better solution for the two areas 
that create the most difficult problems-the expanded territorial sea (which may 
be measured from greatly exaggerated baselines) and archipelagic waters. 
Accordingly, in suggesting the tentative recommendations for formulating 
updated rules applicable in various zones of the oceans as set forth below, I 
have adopted the formulations of the three manuals. While this to some extent 
ignores the problems I have pointed out with respect to these formulations, it 
nevertheless accepts the three manuals as evidence of an emerging international 
law in this area?06 With this caveat in mind, I make the following tentative 
recommendations for reformulation of the rules of naval warfare that are 
affected by the emergence of new zones in the "new" law of the sea: 
1 .  Subject to other applicable rules of the law of armed conflict at sea,207 
hostile operations by naval forces may be conducted on the high seas, the 
territorial sea and internal waters, the land territories, and where applicable the 
archipelagic waters, of the belligerent, any co-belligerent and the enemy. For 
this purpose, the high seas include the exclusive economic zone and the waters 
and airspace above the continental shelf. 
2. When such hostile operations are conducted within the exclusive 
economic zone or the waters or airspace above the continental shelf of a neutral 
State, the belligerent States shall, in addition to observing the other applicable 
rules of the law of armed conflict at sea, have due regard to the rights and duties 
of the coastal State for the exploitation of the economic resources of the 
exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf. They shall, in particular, 
respect artificial islands, installations, structures, and safety zones established 
by neutral States in the exclusive economic zone and on the continental shelf. 
3. Neutral waters consist of the internal waters, territorial sea, and where 
applicable the archipelagic waters, of a State which is not a party to the armed 
conflict. 
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4. Within neutral waters hostile acts by belligerent forces are forbidden. A 
neutral State must exercise such surveillance and enforcement measures as the 
means at its disposal allow to prevent violation of its neutral waters by 
belligerent forces. 
5. Hostile acts within the meaning of paragraph 4 include, inter alia: 
a. Attack or seizure of enemy warships or military aircraft; 
b. Laying of mines; 
c. Visit, search or capture; 
d. Detention of a prize or establishment of a prize court; 
e. Use as a base of operations. lOS 
6. Subject to the duty of impartiality, and under such regulations as it may 
establish, a neutral State may, without jeopardizing its neutrality, permit the 
following acts within its neutral waters: 
a. hmocent passage209 through its territorial sea, and where applicable 
its archipelagic waters, by warships and prizes of belligerent States; for the 
purpose of exercising the right of innocent passage the warship or prize may 
employ pilots of the neutral State; 
b. Replenishment by a warship of its food, water and fuel sufficient to 
reach a port within its national territory; 
c. Repairs of warships found necessary by the neutral State to make 
them seaworthy; such repairs may not include repair of battle damage210 nor 
increase their fighting strength. 
7. A belligerent warship may not extend its stay in neutral waters for longer 
than twenty-four hours unless the neutral State grants an extension because of: 
a. The stress of weather, or 
b. The route of innocent passage is of such length as to require more 
than twenty-four hours for passage. 
8. Belligerent warships and military aircraft may exercise the right of transit 
passage through neutral international straits and archipelagic sea-lanes passage 
through neutral archipelagic waters. While within neutral waters comprising an 
international strait or an archipelagic sea-lane, belligerent naval forces are 
forbidden to carry out any hostile act. 
9. Should a neutral State be unable or unwilling to enforce its neutral 
obligations with respect to hostile military activities by belligerent naval forces 
within its neutral waters, the opposing belligerent may use such force as is 
necessary within such neutral waters to protect its own forces and to terminate 
the violation of neutral waters. 
10. A neutral State shall not be considered to have jeopardized its neutral 
status by exercising any of the foregoing neutral rights nor by allowing a 
belligerent State to exercise any of the privileges permitted to a belligerent State. 
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44. See Fulton, supra note 1 1 ,  Chapter V passim; Jessup, supra note 1 2 ,  passim; O'-
Connell, supra note 28,  at p .  155.  
45. Jessup, supra note 1 2 ,  at p .  20;  Fulton, supra note 1 1 ,  Chapter V, passim. 
46. Fulton, supra note 1 1 ,  at p.  694 .  See also Fulton, Chapter V, passim. 
47. Presidential Proclamation 2667, " Policy of the United States with Respect to the 
Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf, "  28 September 1 945,  
U. S. Federal Register, v. 1 0, p. 1 2303, U. S. Code of Federal Regulations, 1 943-1948 Comp . ,  
v .  3, p.  6 7  (1 945) , reprinted in MaIjorie M.  Whiteman, Digest of International La w  
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1 9(5) , v .  4 ,  p p .  756-757 (hereinafter cited 
as Whiteman) . 
48. White House Press Release of 30 September 1 945 , reprinted in U . S .  Department 
of State Bulletin, v. XII I ,  No. 327, pp. 484-485 (1 945) , reproduced in Whiteman, supra note 
47, pp. 757-758. 
49. Report of the I nternational Law Commission covering the work of its eighth 
session,  23 April-4 July 1 956, supra note 33, at p.  256. 
50. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 34. 
5 1 .  Res. 1 307 (XIII) ,  10 December 1 958.  
52.  See Whiteman, supra note 47, at pp. 1 1 9-1 37. 
53. See discussion in text supra, at notes 38-43. 
54.  I I  Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1 956), supra note 33,  at pp. 294-295 
(emphasis supplied) . 
55.  Ibid. 
56. Convention on the Continental Shelf, 29 April 1 958,  UN Treaty Series, v. 499, 
p. 3 1 1 ,  U.S .T. ,  v.  15, p. 47 1 ,  U.S. T . I . A.S.  No.  5578,  Article 2 .  
57.  Id., article 1 .  
58. Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v .  Nonvay), 1 9 5 1  I .C.]. Reports, p. 1 1 6 (M erits) . 
59. See examples discussed in W. Michael Reisman, " Straight Baselines in  International 
Law: A Call for Reconsideration," Proceedings of tile 82nd Annual Meeting (1988) of the American 
Society of International Law (Washington: American Society of International Law, 1 990) , 
p. 260; see also, Office of Ocean Affairs, U.S.  Department of State, Limits in the Seas No. 
1 1 2: United States Responses to Excessive National Maritime Claims ( 1 2  March 1 992) . 
60. Restatement (Third) , supra note 5. This opinion is also reflected in the joint 
statement of the U.S.  and U.S.S.R. governments at the 1 989 Jackson Hole Summi t  
Conference which included the statement that the two governments were guided b y  the 
provisions of the 1 982 Convention "which, with respect to traditional uses of the oceans, 
generally constitute international law and practice and balance fairly the interests of all States . "  
U . S .  Department of State,  Department of State Bulletin, v. 8 9 ,  fP. 25-26 (December 1 989) . 
6 1 .  U.S.  Department of the Navy, Office of the Chie of Naval Operations, Law of 
Naval Waifare (NWIP 1 0-2) (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1 955) , section 
430a. (NWIP 1 0-2 is the predecessor manual to NWP-9 and is hereinafter cited as NWIP 
1 0-2) . I state "as a general rule" because, under certain circumstances, when a neutral state 
does not live up to its obligation to prevent hostile acts within its maritime territory by one 
belligerent, the opposing belligerent  who is harnled by such acts may take armed self-help 
measures. O'Connell, supra note 28,  at p. 1 1 1 7;  H .  Lauterpacht, Oppenheim 's International 
Law (London, New York, Toronto: Longmans, Green and Co . ,  7th ed, 1 952) ,  v. 2,  p.  695 
(hereinafter cited as Lauterpacht) ; U.S. Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations, The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations (NWP-9 (Rev. A)) 
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1 989) , para. 7 .3 .4 .2  (hereinafter cited as 
NWP-9) . 
62. Lauterpacht, supra note 6 1 ,  p .  (,73; Whiteman, supra note 47, a t  p .  1 78 and sources 
cited therein. The principle is codified in article 9 of Conventioll (XIII) Concerning the 
Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War, 1 8  October 1 907, 36 Stat. 2 4 1 5  (U. S.) , 
1 DO  British & Foreign State Papers ( 1 906-1 907) , pp. 448-454 (U.K.) ,  reprinted at American 
Journal of International Law, v. 2 (Supp.) ,  p. 202 (cited hereinafter as Hague XIII) . 
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63. Hague XIII,  supra note 62. 
64. Dietrich Schindler, "Commentary [on Hague Convention XIIIJ ,"  in  N. Ronzitti 
(ed.) ,  The LAw of Naval Waifare: A Collection of Agreements and Documents with Commentaries 
(Dordrecht, Boston, London: Martinus NijholTPublishers, 1988) , p. 21 1 ,  at pp. 2 1 5 ,  22 1 .  
65. Although Hague XIII does not include the words, "in i ts  territorial waters," State 
practice suggests that this was the meaning intended by the Article. See H. Lauterpacht, supra 
note 6 1 , p. 746 and sources cited therein; Robert W. Tucker, U.S.  Naval War College 
International Law Studies, The LAw of War and Neutrality at Sea (Washington: U.S.  
Government Printing Office, 1 957) , p .  21 9, note 52 (cited hereinafter as  Tucker) . 
66. It is a disputed point as to whether this article applies only to stays in ports, roadsteads 
or territorial waters or also to mere passage through the territorial sea which lasts more than 
twenty-four hours. The Altmark incident, which will be discussed infra note 75, is illustrative 
of how this issue might arise. 
67. It  is a disputed foint as to whether a neutral State may allow a warship to repair 
battle damage in a neutra port. See H . A. Smith, The LAw and Custom of the Sea (New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, 2d ed. ,  1 950) , p .  1 5 4  (cited hereinafter as Smith) ; Colombos, supra 
note 15 ,  pr o 654-657.  In any event, it is settled law that repairs which increase the fighting 
strength 0 the damaged warship are not permitted. See Harvard Research in I nternational 
Law, "Draft Convention on Rights and Duties of Neutral States in Naval and Aerial War," 
Comment on Articles 32-36, American Joumal of Intemational LAw, V. 33 (Supp.) p .  1 69, at 
p .  463 ( 1 939) . 
68. LOS Convention, supra note 2, article 8, para. 3 .  
69 .  Elmar Rauch, The Protocol Additional to  the Geneva Conventiom for the Protection of 
Victims of Intemational Armed Conflicts and the United Natiom Convention on the LAw of the Sea: 
Repercussiom on the LAw of Naval Waifare (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1 984) , p. 32, citing 
Hague XIII, NWIP 10-2, supra note 6 1 ,  and the Soviet Naval International Law Manual 
(Moscow: 1 966) . B oth of these manuals, of course, were published prior to the codification 
of the twelve-mile limit in the UN Law of the Sea Convention. (Dr. Rauch's monograph 
is cited hereinafter as Rauch.) 
70. NWP 9, supra note 61 , para. 7.3.4.2.  
71 . Canadian Forces, LAw of A rmed Conflict Manual (Second Draft) (Ottawa: undated) , 
para. 1 509 (hereinafter cited as Canadian Manuan . It should be noted that as an interim 
measure until its draft manual is completed, the Canadian Armed Forces have promulgated 
MAOP-331 , Handbook on the LAw of Naval Operatiom, which, with a 16-page Canadian 
introduction, incorporates NWP 9 as Annex A. 
72. German Federal Ministry of Defense, Humanitarian LAw in Armed Conflicts--Manual 
(Bonn: 1 992, mimeo) , para. 1 1 1 9 (hereinafter cited as German Manuan . 
73. Hague XIII ,  supra note 62, article 3 (release a prize captured within neutral 's  waters) , 
article 8 (prevent fitting out or arming of warships) , article 25 (exercise surveillance to prevent 
violation of neutrality) . 
74. See authorities cited in note 6 1  supra; see also Whiteman, supra note 47, pp. 1 90 ff. 
and sources cited therein. 
75. For a detailed examination of the Altmark incident, see Brunson MacChesney, U. S. 
Naval War College, Intemational LAw Situations and Documents, 1 956, Situation, Documents, and 
Commentary on Recent Developments in the Intemational LAw of the Sea (Washington : U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1 957) , V. 5 1 ,  pp. 3 If. (hereinafter cited as MacC hesney) . A 
revised version is printed in MacChesney, "The Altmark Incident and Modern Warfare­
'Innocent Passage' in Wartime and the Right of Belligerents to Use Force to Redress 
Neutrality Violations," Northwestem Univ. LAw Review, V. 52, p. 320 Quly-August 1 957) . See 
also, C.H.M. Waldock, "The Release of the Altmark Prisoners, "  British Yearbook of 
Intemational LAw, V. 24, p. 2 1 6  (1 947) . 
76. See Winston S. Churchill, The Gathering Storm (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 
1 948) , pp. 53 1 -532; see also H. A. Smith, supra note 67 at p.  153. 
77. Some States continue to assert that innocent passage of warships is subject to advance 
notification or consent. During UNCLOS Ill ,  a number of States introduced amendments 
to the draft Convention seeking to make this an explicit requirement. Of.ponents pointed 
out that adoption of such a requirement would be a "conference-breaker. ' The matter was 
finally resolved when the President of the Conference persuaded the proponents of the 
amendments to withdraw them in conjunction with his entering into the records of the 
Conference a statement that "their decision is without prejudice to the rights of coastal States 
to adopt measures to safeguard their security interests, in accordance with articles 1 9  and 25 
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of the draft Convention. " United Nations, Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the 
Sea: Official Records (New York: United Nations, 1 984) , v. XVI , p. 132, para. 1 (cited 
hereinafter as UNCLOS O R) .  A number of States made statements at their signing or 
ratification of the Convention that the tenns of the Convention are without prejudice to 
their right to adopt measures regulating the passage of warships through their territorial seas. 
These States included Cape Verde, Democratic Yemen, Egypt, Finland, Iran, O man, 
Romania, Sao Tome and Principe, Sudan, Sweden, and Yemen. See Multilateral Treaties 
Deposited with the Secretary- General, ch. XXI . 6  (ST /LEG /SER.E/8, pp. 780-794) . Several 
States made statements asserting that warships were entitled to exercise the right of innocent 
passage without notitying or obtaining the authorization of the coastal State. See statements 
in the exercise of the right of reply by France, Italy, United Kingdom, and the United States, 
UNCLOS II I  OR, supra, v. XVII,  pp. 241 -244. 
78.  Hague XIII, supra note 58, Article 10. MacChesney's examination of the meaning 
of "mere passage" provides the following insights: "The British who introduced the phrase 
in their draft of [Article 1 0] indicated that innocent passage in the peacetime sense was what 
they had in mind . . . . [T]he peacetime analogy serves to indicate the type of passage that 
belligerents were willing to allow neutrals to grant. The type of passage contemplated is 
limited by two basic criteria. It must be an innocent passage for bona fide purposes of 
navigation rather than for escape or asylum. The passage must be innocent in the sense that 
it does not prejudice either the security interests of the coastal State, or the interests of the 
opposing belligerent in preventing passage beyond the type agreed to in Article X." 
MacChesney, supra note 75,  pp.  1 8- 1 9 .  
79.  Smith, supra note 6 7 ,  p.  1 53; Tucker, supra note 65,  p .  232; NWIP 1 0-2, supra note 
61 , section 443a, note 28; NWP 9,  supra note 6 1 ,  para. 7 .3 .4 . 1 .  Canada's draft manual does 
not appear to recognize the right of neutral States to close their territorial seas to the passage 
of belligerent warships. CanaJian Manual, supra note 71 , para. 1 5 1 1 (3) . The G ennan Manual 
is ambiguous. In paragraph 1 1 30 of the revised draft (August 1 9 9 1 )  it states, "The innocent 
passage through neutral territorial waters of warships belonging to the parties to the conflict 
shall be pennissible" (citing Hague XII I ,  Article 1 0) ,  but in paragraph 1 1 33 it states, "It is 
within the discretion of a neutral state to allow the passage of warships and prizes through 
neutral territorial waters" (also citing Hague XIII,  Article to) .  German Manual, supra note 
72, pars. 1 1 30 and 1 1 33.  
80.  W. Michael Reisman and William K. Lietzau, "Moving International Law from 
Theory to Practice: The Role of Military Manuals in Effectuating the Law of Anned 
Conflict, " in Robertson, supra note 9,  p. 1 at p.  7. 
8 1 .  See authorities cited in note 79 supra. See also Rauch , supra note 69, at pp. 40-44. 
Rauch states that a lthough the 1 907 Hague Conference took up the issue of wartime passage 
through neutral straits, it did not include an article in Hague XIII on the subject. But he also 
states that near unifonn practice since that time justifies the conclusion that "if the littoral 
States are neutral , innocent passage of belligerent warships through international straits in 
time of war may be interfered with only in exceptional cases. "  Id. ,  p.  44 . 
82. United Kingdom v. A lbania (Coifu Channel Case): Men"ts, Judgment, 1 949 I .C.]. 
Reports, p. 4 .  
83 .  /d. , p. 28. 
84. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 34, Article 16, para. 4. 
85. See authorities cited in Horace B. Robertson, Jr., "Passage Through Straits :  A 
Right Preserved in the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea," Virginia 
Journal of International Law, v. 20, p. 801 at p. 803, note 7.  
86. Note that straits joining the high seas or an EEZ with the territorial sea of a foreign 
State are excluded by omission, although they were grouped with other straits used for 
international navigation in the 1 958 Territorial Sea Convention. Compare LOS Convention, 
supra note 2, article 37, with the Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 34, article 1 6 ,  para. 4. 
The right of nonsuspendable innocent passage for such straits is preserved by article 45, para. 
2(b) of the LOS Convention, however. 
87. LOS Convention, supra note 2, article 35 (c) . 
88. Id. ,  article 36. 
89 . /d. , article 38, para. 1 .  
90. Although there is no explicit provision of the Convention so stating, the result 
follows from the fact that this category of straits is not included within either those govemed 
by the regime of transit passage or those governed by article 45 (nonsuspendable innocent 
passage) . 
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9 1 . LOS Convention, supra note 2, Article 45, para. 1 (a) . The most significant effect of 
the non-applicability of transit passage to this category of straits is that it closes them to 
overfligh t by aircraft, and submarines must navigate on the surface and show their flag. Of 
course, if the passage seaward of the island is  truly "of similar convenience with respect to 
navigational and hydrographical characteristics," the requirement to use such an alternate 
passage rather than the strait is of little operational significance. 
92. LO S Convention, supra note 2, article 38, para .  2 (emphasis supplied) . 
93. Id. ,  article 38, para. 1 (c) . 
94.  Civil aircraft are required to observe the rules; State aircraft, which are not bound 
by the I CAO rules, " will normally comply with such safety measures and will at  all times 
operate with due regard for the safety of navigation."  LOS Convention, supra note 2, article 
39, para. 3(a) . 
95 . Id. , article 42, para. t .  
96. !d. , article 42, para. 2 .  
97. Id. , article 42,  para. 5 .  See also, statement of U.K. representative explaini ng the 
meaning of the proposal introduced by his delegation which eventually became article 42. 
UNCLOS J I I  OR, supra note 77,  v. I I ,  Second Committee, 1 1 th Meeting, p. 1 25,  para . 23 . 
See also, LOS Convention, supra note 2, article 304. 
98. See John Norton Moore, "The Regime of Straits and the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea," AmericanJoumal ifIntemational LAw, v. 74, p. 77 at p. 95 
(1 980) ; William T. Burke, "Submerged Passage through Straits: Interpretations of the 
Proposed Law of the Sea Treaty Text , "  Wasilington LAw Review, v. 52, p .  1 93 (1 977) ; 
Robertson, supra note 85,  pp. 843-846. 
99. Rauch, supra note 69, at pp.  45-46 (footnotes omitted) .  
1 00. NW P  9 ,  supra note 6 1 , para. 7 .3 .5 .  
l Ot .  Canadian Manual, supra note 71 ,  para. 1 5 1 1 (2) .  A footnote to  the paragrap h 
identifies those straits to which the right of transit applies, following the criteria laid down 
in Part J I I  of the LOS Convention. 
1 02. See note 79 supra. 
1 03.  LOS Convention, supra note 2, article 35 (c) (emphasis supplied) . 
1 04.  See Convention regarding the Regime of the Straits,  Montreux, 20 July 1 936, 
League of Nations Treaty Series, v .  1 73,  p .  2 1 3, reprinted in Americatl Joumal if Intemalional 
LAw, v. 31 (Supp . ) ,  p .  1 ( 1 937) .  
1 05 .  See Boundary Treaty between the Argentine Republic and Chile, 2 3  July 1 88 1 , 
Consolidated Treaty Series (Parry) ,  v. 1 59,  p. 45.  Article 5 thereof provides, in English 
translation , "Magellan'S Straits are neutralized forever, and free navigation is guaranteed to 
the flags of aU nations ."  In the Argentina-Chile Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1 984, the 
two countries reaffirmed that the Straits of Magellan "are perpetually neutralized and freedom 
of navigation is assured to ships of all flags , "  29 November 1 984, English translation reprinted 
in International Legal Materials, v .  24, p.  1 1  ( 1 985) . 
1 06.  See Treaty for the Redemption of the Sound Dues between Denmark and a number 
of other European States, 14 March 1 857, reprinted i n  English in Consolidated Treaty Series 
(Parry) , v. 1 1 6,  p. 357.  The United States concluded a separate bilateral treaty with Denmark 
discontinuing Sound Dues for ships flying the U.S. flag. Convention for the Discontinuance 
of the Sound Dues, 1 1  April 1 857,  U.S. Statu tes at  Large, v .  1 1 ,  p. 7 1 9, reprinted in  English 
in Parry, v . 1 1 6, p. 465 . I t  should be noted that the ICJ is currently seised of a case concerning 
navigation through the Belts. 
1 07 .  See Convention Relating to the Non-Fortification and Neutralization of the Aaland 
Islands, 20 October 1 92 1 ,  League of Nations Treaty Series, v. 9, p .  2 1 3 ,  reprinted in  A merican 
Joumal if Intemalio;lal LAw, v. 1 7  (Supp.) ,  p. 1 ( 1 923) . 
1 08.  Rauch , supra note 69, p. 53. the two authorities cited in opposition are John Norton 
Moore in "The Regime of Straits and the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of 
the Sea ,"  note 98 supra, at p.  1 1 1 ,  and Pjotr Barabolja in Modemes Seevolkmecht, published 
by the Academy of Science of the USSR, translated into German by Elmar Rauch, v .  1 ,  
(Baden-Baden, 1 978) , p. 230. Professor Moore was Vice Chairman of the U.S.  delegation 
to UNCLOS I I I ;  General Barabolja was a senior member of the Soviet delegation. 
1 09. NWP 9, supra note 6 1 ,  para . 7 .3 .5 .  
1 1 0 .  Montreux Convention, supra note 1 04, articles 19 and 20;  see also, Rauch,  supra 
note 69, p. 5 t .  
1 1  t .  See text supra notes 53-55 . 
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1 1 2 .  Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 34, article 24; LOS Convention, supra note 2, 
article 33. 
1 1 3 .  See text, supra at notes 54 and 55. 
1 1 4. Supra at note 46. 
1 1 5 .  Rauch, supra note 69, p.  33. 
1 1 6.  LOS Convention, supra note 21 , article 56. 
1 1 7.  See Oxman, supra note 8, at p.  848; see also Horace B .  Robertson, Jr. , "Navigation 
in the Exclusive Economic Zone," VirginiaJoumal ojIntemational LAw, v. 24, at pp. 874-875, 
and note 52. 
1 1 8. For a full discussion of this issue,  which has been frequently debated in the legal 
literature, see Barbara Kwiatkowska, The 200 Mile Exclusive Economic Zone in the New LAw of 
the..5ea (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1989) , pp. 230-235 (cited 
hereinafter as Kwiatkowska) . 
1 1 9 .  Elliot Richardson, "Power, Mobility and the Law of the Sea," Foreign AjJairs, Spring 
1 980, p. 902 at p. 91 6 (emphasis in original) . 
1 20. Professor Oxman concludes that the addition of the phrase, "other internationally 
lawful uses, etc . . . .  " is the "functional substitute for the ' inter alia' in article 87 . "  Oxman, 
supra note 8,  at p.  837.  
1 2 1 .  !d. at pp. 837-838.  
1 22.  See Oxman, supra note 8. 
1 23.  Rauch, supra note 69, at p.  34, quoting from Sveriges Flotta, v. 70, pp. 8-1 1 (1 974) 
(emphasis supplied) . 
1 24. See, for example, UNCLOS III  OR, supra note 77, v. XVI I ,  p. 54, para . 224. 
125. Rauch, supra note 69, p.  36. 
1 26. Id. ,  p. 37. 
1 27.  !d. , quoting from James Brown Scott, TI,e Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences, 
The Conference oj 1 907 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1 920) , v. I ,  p. 288, Report of 
the Third Commission to the Conference, meeting of9 October 1 907 (Annexes) , at p. 290. 
1 28 Id., p. 38 . 
1 29.  Statement of the delegate of Brazil, Plenary, 1 87th Meeting, 7 December 1 982, 
UNCLOS III  OR, supra note 77, v .  XVII,  p .  40, para. 28. 
130. Statement of the representative of Cape Verde, 1 88th Meeting, Plenary, UNCLOS 
III OR, supra note 77, v. XVII ,  p .  62, para. 124. 
1 3 1 .  Statement of the representative of Uruguay, 1 92nd Meeting, Plenary, UNCLOS 
III  OR, supra note 77, v. XVI I ,  p. 1 20, para. 55.  
132.  Italy, Statement made in the exercise of the right of reply, 7 March 1 983, UNCLOS 
I I I  OR, supra note 77, v. XVII ,  pp. 24 1 -242; France, Statement made in the exercise of the 
right of reply, 12 May 1 983, id. , p.  241 ; United States of America, Statement made in the 
exercise of the right of reply, 8 March 1 983, id. , pp. 243-244. 
133. T.T.B. Koh, in Jon M. Van Dyke (ed.) , Consensus and Confrontation: The United 
States and the LAw oj the Sea Convention (A Workshop of the Law of the Sea Institute, Honolulu, 
Hawaii, January 9-13, 1 984) (Honolulu: LOS Institute, 1 985) , p .  304. 
1 34. See Kwiatkowska, supra note 1 1 8,  p .  21 1 .  
1 35.  See Kwiatkowska, id. , note 1 18,  p .  203. 
136.  Carladian Manual, supra note 7 1 ,  para. 703. 
137.  German Manual, supra note 72, para .  1 01 1 .  The German Manual adds a cautionary 
note that, "The rights of coastal and archipelagic states must, however, be taken into due 
consideration. "  Ibid. A similar cautionary statement is carried in a footnote in the Canadian 
Manual . Supra note 7 1 ,  para. 703, note 1 .  
138. NWP 9 ,  supra note 6 1 ,  para. 7 .3 .  
1 39. LOS Convention, supra note 2 ,  article 56,  para. 3 .  
1 40. LOS Convention, supra note 2 ,  article 76. 
1 4 1 .  Id. , article 77. 
142. !d. , article 80. 
1 43.  Id. , article 78. 
1 44. Id. ,  article 60(6) . 
1 45 .  !d. ,  article 80 (incorporating article 60 mutatis m utandis) . 
1 46.  Convention on the Continental Shelf, 29 April 1 958, U.N. Treaty Series, v. 499, 
p. 31 1 ,  article 2. 
1 47. LOS Convention, supra note 2 ,  article 77. 
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1 48.  See Tullio Treves, "Military Installations, Structures, and Devices on the Seabed, " 
A mericanJoumal of Int'l lAw, v. 74, p. 808, at p. 834 (cited hereinafter as Treves) . 
1 49.  See id. at p. 839 
150. !d. , pp. 840-846. 
1 5 1 .  An alternative argument legitimizing the employment of weapons or other military 
devices on the seabed of the EEZ and continental shelf could be made on the basis that 
military devices, such as mines and detection or surveillance devices are not "installations or 
structures . "  Some weight is added to this argument by the replacement of the nomenclature 
"installations and devices" in the 1 958 Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 1 46, 
article 5,  by "installations and structures" in the 1 982 Convention. See Treves, supra note 
1 48,  p.  841 . A second alternative basis for the same conclusion, at least for detection and 
surveillance devices, can be found in the explicit provisions in articles 58 and 79 recognizing 
the right of all States to lay and maintain submarine cables . Id. ,  pp. 842-843. 
152. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and 
Under Water, S August 1 963, U.N. Treaty Series, v. 480, p.  43. 
153. Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other 
Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, 
1 1  February 1 97 1 , U.N. Treaty Series, v. 955, p. 1 1 5 .  
1 5 4. Treaty for the Prohibition o f  Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, with Additional 
Protocols I and 11 , 1 4  February 1 967, U.N. Treaty Series, v. 634, p. 28 I .  
155 .  U.S.  Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Interna­
tional Security Affairs) , Maritime Claims Reference Manual (Washington: U.S.  Dept. of 
Defense, 1989) , v. 2, p .  232 (for sale by the National Technical Information Service as DoD 
2005 . 1 -M) .  Although Indonesia is the paradigm case of an archipelagic State, the archipelagic 
waters claimed by a number of other States enclose ocean areas of substantial dimensions. 
Examples include (with their approximate North-South and East-West dimensions in 
nautical miles) : Cape Verde ( 1 44 x 1 30) , Fiji (300 x 300) , Papua-New Guinea (840 x 600) , 
Solomons (500 x 1 20) , Vanuatu (420 x 1 00) . Ibid. , passim. The Republic of the Philippines 
is not included in this list because its archipelagic baselines, which are drawn in a manner 
inconsistent with the LOS Convention, are not generally recognized as valid. 
156.  Rauch, supra note 69, at p.  33. 
1 57.  NWP 9,  supra note 6 1 ,  para. 7.3.6.  The Annotated version ofNWP-9 footnotes this 
statement to Hague XIII ,  articles 1 ,  2 and 5, and NWIP 1 0-2, para. 441 , both of which 
address neutral waters in the context of the territorial sea and internal waters only. 
1 58. Canadian Manual, supra note 7 1 ,  para . 1 509. 
1 59. !d. , para. 703. See also para. 706, entitled "Passage Through Neutral Waters, " which 
provides in part that, "Neutral waters are the internal waters and the territorial seas, including 
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